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THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION
IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Sean Byrne, Cynthia Irvin, Eyob Fissuh, and Chris Cunningham

Abstract

External economic assistance from the International Fund for Ireland and the
European Union Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation assisted in
setting the context of the Northern Ireland peace agenda, and holds out the promise
of a new civic culture. This article explores people's perceptions of economic
assistance of conflict amelioration in Northern Ireland. Some of the findings, in
respect of inter-community differences in perceptions of the utility of external
economic assistance in building the peace dividend, are discussed in the paper.
Introduction
The closing years of the twentieth century brought renewed optimism that
sectarian tension and ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland could be resolved. After
years of failure and frustration, politicians negotiated a framework to devolve power
and build upon the fragile peace between the Catholics and Protestant communities.
The global community paid close attention as most of all major political parties in
Northern Ireland except for the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) now comfortably
the largest Unionist party signed onto the 1998 Belfast Good Friday Agreement
(GFA). However, to the frustration (and perhaps surprise) of many, those on the
ground slowly realized that the GF A cannot transform society and politics alone
(Ruane and Todd, 2000, 2001). Indeed, the crisis of identity in Northern Ireland is
so deep, that only an all-encompassing transformational approach to conflict
resolution--one that addresses components of the conflict beyond constitutional
matters, such as cross-communal relationships, political polarity, socioeconomic
status, and the challenge of identity politics, to name but a few--can empower the
people on both sides of the conflict well enough to embrace peace (Morrow, 2001;
Ruane and Todd, 1996).
This article covers an important aspect of settlement, given that the
statistical measurement of people's perceptions of economic assistance in conflict
amelioration in Northern Ireland had not been undertaken before our 1997 survey.
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PlRA) had only just called its second
ceasefire when the data was gathered and no political deal had been clinched. Given
external funding for peace processes globally, the research here could have a wider
remit beyond Northern Ireland. The objective of this article is to examine public
perceptions of external economic assistance on the peacebuilding process in
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2
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Northern Ireland as manifested in the pre-GF A 1997 perceptions of respondents on
the role of these funds on community economic development, and on the reduction
of violence, and the role of these funds in building the peace dividend. Very
considerable economic resources have been committed to resolving the conflict, yet
we have little empirical evidence of their impact (McGarry and O'Leary, 1995).
Economic assistance fits in with the general civil society approach to conflict
resolution (Pearson, 2001; Sandole, 2002). Moreover, the article analyzes the effect
of the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and European Union (EU) Special
Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation on sustainable economic
development in Northern Ireland. The article begins with a discussion of the role of
economic assistance in building the peace dividend in Northern Ireland. The
research findings and their implications are then highlighted.

Economic Assistance and Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland
Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland today remain largely divided
over national issues of identity. Except for a growing middle class, the working
class lives largely in separate enclaves, attend different churches and schools, and
socially distance themselves from the other community (Byrne and Irvin, 2002).
Since partition in 1921, Nationalists and Unionists in Northern Ireland have
competed for scarce resources in one of the poorest peripheries of the EU, which
has in part prompted bicommunal conflict (Byrne and Ayulo, 1998). Between 1920
and 1972, Unionist regimes used populist economic policies that favored its
Protestant majority while discriminating against the minority Catholics (Bew, et al.,
1979). Under unionist rule, there were few opportunities for Catholic Nationalists
while Protestant Unionists enjoyed all of the economic privileges of a populist
regime in Belfast, the capital of government in Northern Ireland before the 1972
introduction of British direct rule (Bew et al., 1979, 1995).
Unionist control institutionalized discriminatory practices against Catholics
creating large disparities between the two communities. The populist policies of the
Northern Ireland state manufactured discrimination in housing, employment, and
job creation that worked to the advantage of the Unionists and to the disadvantage
of the Nationalist community (Bew et al., 1979, 1995). Prior to the Northern
Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) movement of the 1960s, Nationalists
were generally poorer and less educated than Unionists, and were two-and-a-half
times more likely to be unemployed (Dixon, 2001; McGarry and O'Leary, 1995;
Tomlinson, 1995).
Today, university entrance rates are similar for both
communities.
On a larger scale, British government policy also contributed to segregation
and alienation within society by its historic failure to address its economic woes.
Past British government policy often dealt only with symptoms not the root causes
of structural inequalities, and even then in manners which tended to exacerbate
rather than ameliorate competition between the two communities (Byrne and Irvin,
2002). British economic policy largely sought to stabilize the political status quo in
Northern Ireland, rather than try to resolve the underlying roots of the conflict.
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2
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"The Northern Ireland problem has not been high on Britain's political agenda, and
the government's major priority has been to limit the cost of this involvement; thus
the responses to economic inequality and unemployment can be described as
superficial and palliative" (Bew and Patterson, 1985, p. 75).
Economic negligence of N orthcrn Ireland's working classes leaves Britain
partly responsible for the feelings of alienation, distrust, and sectarianism felt in
both communities (Bew and Patterson, 1985).
Consequently, poverty and
unemployment, which reached over 70 percent for males over several generations in
urban communities supportive of Republican and Loyalist Paramilitaries, have
stricken nationalist communities across the region (Byrne and Irvin, 2001 ).
Northern Ireland's economy is arguably the most subsidized and public sector
dependent in Western Europe. It is true that much British finance was ploughed into
security, but the subvention went beyond this.
The IFI and the EU Fund were set up to support economic regeneration and
peacebuilding within Northern Ireland and the border area (Byrne and Irvin, 2001).
The IFI was established in 1985 after the British and Irish governments signed the
AJA to foster greater cooperation between both governments. London and Dublin
had stipulated that both governments sought to:
Promote the economic and social development of those areas of both
parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from the
consequences of the instability of recent years, and shall consider the
possibility of securing international support for this work (Anglo-Irish
Agreement, 1985, p. 2).
The AIA specifically established economic support fund assistance for United
States (US) contributions to the IFI; its language reflected the US' s belief of a
strong relationship between peace and economic development. The AJA proposed
"to provide for the US contributions in support of the Anglo-Irish Agreement," so
that "all may live in peace, free from discrimination, terrorism, and intolerance and
with the opportunity for both communities to participate fully in the structures and
processes of government" (Irvin and Byrne, 2002, p. 134). Economic development
was also seen as a means to building peace because it could improve the conditions
that bred violence.
The US initiated funding of the IFI with US $50 million in 1986, and
through 1996 had funded more than US $500 million (Irvin and Byrne, 2002).
Other donors to the IFI include the EU, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. The
EU contributed US $18.3 million per year from 1989 until 1994, when it increased
its annual contribution to approximately US $24.4 million per year supplanting the
US as the largest donor to the fund in response to the 1994 cease-fires between
paramilitary groups (Irvin and Byrne, 2002).
Likewise, the EU positively responded to steps in the peace process. It
created a special economic task force designed to promote community ties and
dialogue, as well as strengthen and encourage existing political agreements with
economic incentives and support. This resulted in the 1994-1999 EU Special
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2
-3-

Support Prag;
address unen
peace and rec1
Commission.
1994-1998, ai
Irvin, 2002).
depressed reg
(Irvin and B _
peace and
development
cross-border c
As a
highlight bot
external ecOI
empowering t
advancing sm
. society. It is ii

The
constructed b:
Brown Ulster
public percep1
commissioned
of funding fn
Reconciliatior
August 6 to .
definitive qw
interviews we
throughout _interviews we
and "I don't 1
effective samr
controlled b_
perceptions oJ
towards one's
of the person t
This s
quantitative r
specifically bi
dependent vm
This section d
given to the ir

The Role of Economic Assistance in Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland

:al agenda, and
olvement; thus
! described as
leaves Britain
rianism felt in
poverty and
I generations in
il.ilitaries, have
Irvin, 2001 ).
I public sector
- ploughed into
,generation and
Irvin, 2001 ).
enis signed the
Ion and Dublin

Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation in Ireland, which primarily aims to
address unemployment and social exclusion, while maintaining momentum for
peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Byrne and Irvin, 2001). The European
Commission, which initiated the fund, promised US $393 million for the period
1994-1998, and has since proposed over US $220 in additional funds (Byrne and
Irvin, 2002). Combined with substantial EU structural funds for economically
depressed regions, the EU invested 1.2 billion ECU (US $1 .4 billion) as of 2000
(Irvin and Byrne, 2002, p. 135). Similar to the IFI, the Peace Fund aims to reinforce
peace and stability, and promote reconciliation, by increasing economic
development and employment; promoting urban and rural regeneration; developing
cross-border cooperation; and extending social inclusion (Irvin and Byrne, 2002).
As a result of a vibrant marketing campaign by both the EU and IFI to
highlight both funds we might expect people to have a positive perception of
external economic assistance. The provision of both funds is important in
empowering the grassroots promoting social inclusion, boosting economic growth,
advancing socioeconomic regeneration, and reinforcing progress toward a peaceful
. society. It is important to explore this systematically.
Methodology
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The data analyzed are from a Northern Ireland public opm1on survey
constructed by Drs. Irvin and Byrne and conducted in August 1997 by Millward
Brown Ulster. The data-set is unique as it is the first empirical study to examine
public perceptions of economic assistance to Northern Ireland. Both senior authors
commissioned Millward Brown Ulster to assess the public perceptions of the impact
of funding from the IFI and from the EU Special Support Program for Peace and
Reconciliation. A representative sample of 610 adults (18+) were interviewed from
August 6 to 8, 1997 by fully trained and experienced interviewers, according to the
definitive quality standards of the Interviewer Quality Control Scheme. All
interviews were carried out face-to-face at 50 sampling points selected at random
throughout Northern Ireland normally in each respondent's home. Two of the
interviews were excluded from the data set as they were defective. Missing values
and "I don't know" responses were removed from the analyses. This reduced the
effective sample to less than 608 in all the cases. The stratified random sample was
controlled by gender, age, class, and religion. The dependent variables are the
perceptions of the contribution of funds: toward peace, toward reducing violence,
towards one's own community economic development, and the economic situation
of the person that last three years.
This study employs a special class of regression techniques in general and
quantitative response models in particular in testing some hypotheses. More
specifically binary probit and ordered probit models are employed for the binary
dependent variables and ordinal dependent variables respectively (Greene, 2003).
This section develops the key characteristics of these models. Special emphasis is
given to the interpretation of the coefficients as it is very crucial to our discussion.
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-4-

The Role of Economic Assistance in Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland

We start with the binary dependent variable models and then we proceed to the
ordered probit model.
As in Wooldrige (2002) we employ the binary dependent variable
regression model of the form

E[y Ix]= O[l-F(x' fJ)] + l[F(x' /J)]

= F(x' fJ)

1.0

Where x is kxn data matrix and /3 is kx 1 vector of the coefficients. It is noteworthy
that in the probability regression models (in our case we employ logistic and normal
distributions) we employ the parameters of the model, like those of the non-linear
models, which may not reflect the true marginal effects. That is to say the
coefficients are not the same as the marginal effects. Rather the generic marginal
effect form is given by,

aE[y Ix] = {dF(x' /J )}/J = .f(x' /J )fJ
ax
d(x'/J)
1.1
Where

.f(.)

is the density function that corresponds to the cumulative probability

distribution function, F(.). As it is clear from equation (1.1) to get the marginal
effect we need to weight the slope by probability density. Hence, for a binary probit
model the marginal effect would be given by:

aE[y/ x]
ax

= {dF(x'/J)}/J = <fJ(x'/J)/J
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where <fJ(t) is the standard normal density.

a Prob(y

=f

ax
1.4

This is what we have reported in Table 1. Equation (1.1) also illustrates that the
value of the marginal effect depends on the level of all variables ( X; ). This leaves
us with a decision about the values of the variables to be used to compute these
effects. In our case the marginal effects are calculated at mean values of all other
variables. But this approach is not without flaws. First, given the nonlinear nature
of the model it is not an easy task to translate the marginal effects into changes in
the predicted probability that will occur if there is discrete change in one of the
variables. This is pertinent to our modeling because most of our explanatory
variables are binary outcomes. To get around this problem we calculate the
difference at the values of 1 and 0. Keeping this in mind the results could be
interpreted as follows. Let us take the marginal effect of the variable GENDER on
the perceived effect of the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund on violence in
Model 5, Table 1. For a male individual respondent the predicted probability of
perceiving the contribution of the IFI and EU economic assistance positively is
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higher by 0.234(23.4 percent) than his female counterparts keeping all other
variables constant. All the other coefficients can be interpreted likewise.
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Ordered Probit
We have also used an ordered probit model for perceptions about the importance of
the !FI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund on economic development. As is
common in the literature we will motivate the usage of ordered probit with a latent
variable approach as we assume that there is a continuous unobservable function,
which maps into the observed categories. Similar to the binary response models the
coefficients in these models, the parameters, are not marginal effects. We can
illustrate this point in the case of three ordinary value variables as follows:
In the mode of the importance of the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation
fund on one's own economic development we have three categories, which are:
important ( y = 2 ), neutral ( y = l, neither important nor unimportant), and not
important ( y = 0 ). In this case because we have three categories our model has
only one unknown threshold parameter. Note that our model also has a constant.
The three probabilities are given by:
Prob(y = 0 / x) = l-<l>(X'/3)
Pr ob(y = 1/ x) = <I>(µ - X' /3) - <I>(- X' /3)
1.3
Prob(y = 21 X) = 1-<1>(µ-X'/3)
and the marginal effects of changes in the three regressors are

aPr ob(y = 0 IX) = -rj)(X' /J)/J
ax
aProb(y = 0 IX) =[rp(-X' /3)- rp(µ _ X' /3)]/3
ax
1.4

aPr ob~X= 21 X) = rp(µ _ X' /3) /3
As the above equations demonstrate with the exception of the outcome y
outcome

y

=J

and

=0, we cannot a priori state that a positive (negative) parameter also

implies that probability rises (falls) with X; because it will depend on the relative

ence m
;:3~ility of
· \·ely is

densities in equation (1 .4). Similar to our binary response model it is important to
note that the marginal effect of the dummy variable needs special attention. For
example, in all of our models GENDER is a dummy variable and since it is a
discrete variable the marginal effect reported is a discrete change. We analyze this
discrete change by comparing the probabilities that result when the variable takes its
two different values with those that occur with the other variables held at their
sample means.
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Unlike the binary probit models in the case of ordered probit models the
interpretation of the marginal effects is not straightforward. Instead interpretation in
terms of odds ratio is simple. For example, from Model 5 in Table 1 the odds of the
perception of Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) supporters being in favor of the
positive role of the IFJ and EU Peace and Reconciliation funded projects versus the
combined outcome of perceiving the contribution to be from unfair to not fair at all
is lower by 1.03 times than other political party supporters.
With this in mind, we now tum to the issue of goodness of a model. There
is no one conventional measure of goodness of fit for these models. But in most
cases the very least measure that should be reported is the maximized value of the
log likelihood function. Thus, we have reported the log likelihood ratio and the
limiting x 2 values for all the models. It is also commonplace to report the actual
versus predicted probabilities. Another reliable and popular measure of goodness of
fit is the Hit and Miss table with the counted R 2 . However, it merits mention that
the usual R 2 value has no much value in these kind of nonlinear models. Besides
the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) does not try to fit using the prediction
of y as it is in a classical ordinary method (which maximizes R 2 ). Rather it is
chosen to maximize the joint density of the observed dependent variable
(Wooldridge, 2002).
Data and Key Variables

Following we briefly discuss the key independent variables that arc
employed in our data.
Political party: It is the task of this article to investigate any association of the
perception of the respondents about the importance of both of these funds to
economic development, and the importance of these funds to peaccbuilding and the
reduction of violence. We generated nine dummy variables for each of the political
parties. The ten political parties are: Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP), Alliance Party, Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), United
Kingdom Unionist Partycwrb nh g (UKUP), Conservative Party, Social Democratic
and Labor Party (SDLP), Sinn Fein (SF), the Women's Coalition Party, and the new
defunct Unionist Democratic Party (UDP). The main objective is to investigate any
systematic association between political affiliation and the perceptions of these
respondents. It is expected that the political affiliation of a respondent influence the
perception about the likely effects of these funds on peace building, the reduction of
violence, and economic development.
Class: Another key variable of interest in the hypotheses testing is the category of
the economic class a respondent belongs to. Three dummy variables were generated
to represent the three economic income classes-the ABCl (professional class), DE
(skilled class) and C2 (semi-skilled class). It is expected that all three classes,
especially the semi-skilled class will welcome economic assistance from both
funding agencies as unemployment is a serious issue in working class communities.
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2
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Age: The variable age is also included as a determinant factor on the models
considered. It is expected that age will have an effect on the evaluation of citizens
about the respective funds. This way we will able to control the effect of age on the
models considered in this article.
Relation: The relation variable is a dummy variable that indicates the relationship a
person has with the funding agency. It is in effect expected to capture the benefits a
person reaps from any cross community project by its network effect. It is expected
that this variable will affect the perception of respondents on the role of these funds
in establishing peace and economic development. However, it is hard to a priori
postulate on the expected direction of effect. It is expected that those respondents
who have a personal tie to one or both of the funding agencies will be supportive of
their efforts to empower local communities.
Gender: A gender variable is also included in our model to indicate whether a
person is female or male. It is our expectation that gender will have a significant
effect in perception about the role of economic assistance on conflict resolution.
Gender assumes a value of 1 if a respondent is female and zero otherwise. It is our
expectation that females will be more favorable to the funding agencies efforts to
build a peaceful society than males.
Religion: It is well known that religion is a badge of identity for both communities
in the Northern Ireland conflict. To capture the role ofreligion the respondents were
classified into three religions groups, Catholic, Protestant and others. Accordingly
there arc three dummy variables for each religious group. The other religion group
is used as a reference group. It is expected that Catholics compared to Protestants
will be more favorable to the goals and objectives of both funding agencies.
Results

This section presents the regression estimates. Table 1 summarizes the
results of this analysis. The first model, Model 1, presents the probit model where
the dependent variable is perceived importance of the IFI and the EU Peace and
Reconciliation fund on the peace process in Northern Ireland. Model 2 reports a
probit model for the perceived role of these funds on the reduction of violence.
Model 3 presents an ordered probit model where the dependent variable is perceived
importance of· the IFI funds on community economic development. Model 4
presents an ordered probit model where the dependent variable is perceived
importance of the EU fund on community economic development. Finally, Model 5
presents a probit model where the dependent variable is a binary variable for the
personal economic situation of a respondent during the last three years before the
survey was conducted.
Model of Importance of IFI and EU Funded Projects to One's Own Economic
Development

This section examines the respondents' perceptions of the importance of
both the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund on community economic
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2
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development. To examine this relationship two ordered probit models, Model 3 and
Model 4 were fitted. The dependent variable in each case has three categories,
"important", "neutral", and "not important," which assume values of 2, 1, and 0
respectively. The results from both models support the fact that the perception of
Catholics is less favorable than the perception of other religious groups on the role
IFI and EU funded projects play in the development of their communities. This
tends to support the claim by (Honaker, 2004) who argues that duration of
unemployment for Catholics is relatively higher than those for Protestants, i.e., the
exit rate is very low.
Also age has a positive and significant association with the perception of
the importance ofIFl and EU funded projects to one's community's development in
both models. The older a person is the higher the probability that the person is going
to recognize the importance of IFI and EU funded projects to her/his own
community economic development.
Gender is also found to be negative and statistically significant at less than
the 5 percent level in both models. More specifically the marginal effects suggest
that the probability that male respondents see a positive role for these funds on their
community's economic development are higher than their female counterparts. This
result may be explained by the fact that perhaps relatively few females are aware of
these funds in Northern Ireland. This finding in turn may also be explained by the
fact that more men are in positions of power and privilege in society than women,
which may emanate from a relative differential with regards to access to, and
knowledge of the funding agencies.
Models 3 and 4 also show that age and some political party identifiers are
statistically significant to warrant interpretation of the results. As far as political
affiliation is concerned the two models tend to produce different results. Model 3
shows that the probability of the perceptions of a respondent from the Conservative
Party and Women's Coalition party have higher chances of perceiving a positive
role of these funds on their community's development than the other respondents.
Moreover, in Model 4 only the dummy variable for the Women's Coalition party is
positive and significant at less than the I percentage level. Age is found to be
significant in both models. It is important to note that both the Conservative Party
and the Women's Coalition are very minor political parties and so the sample of
respondents supporting these parties would be very small and any conclusions to be
drawn from them must be treated with caution.
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We have also tried to explore the determinants of the economic situation of
a person three years before the survey was taken, which is expected to shed some
light on any possible link between economic growth and political party
membership. This analysis assumes that the economic situation of an individual
could be used as a proxy for economic growth. Model 6 in Table 1 reports the
marginal effects of the probit model for the economic situation of individuals the
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last three years before the survey. The regression output indicates that the variables
Age, Class (ABCl), and "Relation" included in the model are statistically
significant. One's perceived economic situation seems to have a positive correlation
with age. This may be explained in part by the productivity effect as suggested by
human capital theory.
Table 1: Binary prob it and ordered probit models
Model I
uE[yl x]
_a_x_

perception of
:Yelopment in
:rson 1s gomg
her/his own
at less than
ifects suggest
funds on their
terparts. This
, are aware of
lained by the
than women,
:cess to, and
It

dentifiers are
as political
LLlts. Model 3
Conservative
ng a positive
respondents.
jtion party is
found to be
:rvative Party
he sample of
;lusions to be
i.r

·tuation

Model2

Model 3

z-stat

~

z-stat

Model 5
uE[yl x]

~

aE[y lx]

ax

z-stat

Model 4
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Relation

-0.057*

(-3.7)

-0.07

(-0.52)

-0.076

(-1.41)

Gender
Age
UUP
DUP
Alliance

0.088**
-0.001
-0.091 **
-0.313*
0.147

(l .92)
(-0.55)
(-1.83)
(-3.41)
(l .49)

0.14**
-0.12

(l.95)
(-1.23)

0.09
0.13
0.00

(0.92)
(0.71)
(0.02)

-0.437*
0.015*
-0.207
0.030
-0.216

(-2.79)
(3.33)
(-0.94)
(0. l)
(-0.74)

0.014*
-0.048
0.001
0.032

(-1.67)
(2.59)
(-0.2)
(0.0)
(0.1)

0.234***
-0.0156*
0.204
-0.15
-0.355

(-1.72)
(-3.53)
(0.96)
(-0.52)
(-1.08)

0.053
-0.010**
-0.214
-0.144
0.022

PlJP
UDP

-0.378*
0.108

(-2.64)

0.42**
0.01

(2.48)
(0.05)

0.286
0.291

(0.66)
(0.49)

0.153
0.197

(0.34)
(0.34)

-1.103*
0.226

(-2.65)
(0.47)

-0.606
-0.361

UKUP

-0.06

(-0.23)

(-1.74)

-0.292

(-0.53)

-0.444

(-0.78)

-0.29

(-0.4)

-0.267

Conservative
Party
SDLP
Sinn Fein
Woman Coalition
ABCl class
C2 class

0.016
0.07
-0.068
-0.026
0.141*
0.054

(0.10)
(1.02)
(-0.74)
(-0 l I)
(2.141)
(0.054)

0.17**
*
-0.15
-0.22
0.09
-0.22*
-0.06

(-1.80)
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-0.92
(-2.96)
(-0.67)
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)
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(-0.36)
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0.004
-0.29
0.629*
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Protestant

-0.056
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(-0.36)
(0.35)

-0.03
-0.05

(-0.19)
(-0.25)

-l.092**
0.678

(-1.94)
(1.19)

0.788

(-2.08)
(1.31)

0.805***
0.358

(-1.74)
(0.78)

Cutpointl
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2.398*
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Predicted
Probabilit/

1.523*

(5.49)

1.644*

(-4.02)

0.62
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Wald chi square

61.04
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-0.174*

0.270*
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••

0.38**
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0.694

0.63
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0.7
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Observations

268
451
451
509
509
Source: August 1997 Millward Brown Ulster Survey. Note: * significant at 1% level**
Significant at 5% level;*** significant at I 0% level . "calculated at mean value.
Model 1: dependent variable contribution of funds towards peace
Model 2: dependent variable contribution of funds towards reducing violence
Model 3: dependent variable importance of the IFI funds on own community
economic development (three categories)
Model 4: dependent variable importance of the EU funds on own community
economic development (three categories)
Model 5: dependent variable imponance of the EU and IFJ funds on own community
economic development (three categories)
Model 6: dependent variable economic situation of the person the last three years
Note: In 1999, the Unionist Democratic Party (UDP) disbanded.

Table 2: Hit and Miss Tables
Model 2

Model 1
Actual

Actual

Predicted

Yes

No

Total

Yes

261

127

388

No

52

69

121

Total

313

196

509

Predicted

Yes

No

Total

Yes

97

40

137

No

41

90

131

138

130

268

Total

Model 3
Actual

Model4
Actual

Predicted

Yes

No

Total

Yes

261

127

388

No

52

69

121

Total

313

196

509

Predicted
Yes
No
Total

Predicted

Yes

No

Total

Yes

97

40

137

No

41

90

131

Total

138

130

268

Model 5
Actual
Yes
No
Total

295
18

313

112
26
138

407
44

451

Source : August 1997 Millward Brown Ulster Survey
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509

•., level**

__ mmunity
:-cmmunity
:ornmunity _
: years

Total

137

l3l
_58

~Ota.I

451

According to human capital theory age earnings profile is usually a concave
function. If we assume the person's economic situation is highly dependent on
individual earnings the positive coefficient of age in the model is not unexpected.i
Further, the economic situation of the last three years before the survey was taken is
positively related to the ABC 1 economic class. The probability that the economic
situation of a person from the professional class ABC 1, improving her or his
situation during the last three years of the survey is higher than the respondents in
the other economic strata. What is more striking is that the relationship that a person
has with the funding agency has a positive and significant correlation with her or his
economic situation, i.e., the coefficient of "Relation" is positive and significant.
More specifically the probability that the perceived economic situation of a person
who has a good relationship with the funding agency to be at a better economic
position in society is about 0.17 4 higher than a person who has no relationship with
either of the funding agencies community development officers. This finding may
suggest some form of favoritism or positive spillovers from such projects either in
terms of the allocation of aid or employment. The finding may also imply the
significance of personal relationships and connections within the culture, which
would need a separate treatment with appropriate techniques. Thus, financial
assistance instead of having a curative role for the political problem may have the
potential to aggravate conflicts by increasing inequality in the society. This may
also imply that economic aid by itself may not be enough to transform the conflict
and should be complemented with political solutions. It is worth noting that except
for the three variables discussed no variable is significant in the regression model.
Our model has also reasonable strength of goodness of fit. The log
likelihood ratio, which follows, X 2 (37.79) is found to be large enough to reject the
null hypothesis of the coefficient vector, which is zero. In addition, the Hit and Miss
table report in Table 2 illustrates that the counted R 2 to be 0.71. Likewise, the
counted R 2 can also be calculated from the Hit and Miss table for the other models.

Contribution of Cross Community Projects to Peace
In this section we examine the perceived contribution of cross community
projects to peace. In other words, we explore any systematic relationship between
financial assistance and peace in Northern Ireland by estimating a binary probit
model. Model 1 in Table 1 reports the probit model. The findings have far reaching
implications for the role of economic assistance to completely solve ethnopolitical
conflicts.
Before discussing the results in Table 1 we need to explain the construction
of the dependent variable, which was constructed from an answer to the question
"do you think that community projects have helped to bring about peace?" The
response categories are yes, no, or I don't know. The "I don't know" options were
excluded from the regression analysis so that the estimated model is a non-linear
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probability model with binary response. Accordingly, a probit model was estimated.
Some of the implications from the regression analysis are now outlined.
Model I in Table I reports the probit model with the dependent variable being
the perceived contribution of the IFI and the EU Peace and Reconciliation fund on
the peace process. According to Model I not all the explanatory variables are
statistically significant. We discuss the variables, which have statistically significant
coefficients.
RELATION: The relationship of a respondent to the funding agencies has a
positive effect on the perception towards the contribution of community projects to
peace. The closer a respondent is to the funding agency the higher the chances are
that she or he feels it is going to contribute to peace. Recall from the previous
section that this variable had a positive effect in Model 4 where the dependent
variable is the perceived economic situation of the respondent. This may imply two
things. The first straight forward implication is that the perception of individuals
who are closer to the funding agencies may be biased in their assessment. Another
possibility is that because these people are closer to the funding agencies
community development officers they might have an information advantage, which
enabled them to evaluate the true impact of these funds on their own lives and on
the society. Which one is more dominant is a question for further research.
However, these results indicate the prospect for a positive role of these funds on
peacebuilding in Northern Ireland.
PUP and DUP: Model 1 also shows that the supporters of PUP and DUP are
less likely to perceive the importance of cross community projects to building peace
than those from other political parties. In other words, our results suggest that the
supporters of the PUP and DUP perceive that the cross community projects funded
by the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund have done nothing to maintain or
contribute to the peace process. The DUP's support for the GFA is lukewarm.
ABC/ Class: One's membership of ABCI class relative to DE class increases
the probability of perceiving the projects' contribution towards peace positively.
This is not surprising. The coefficient of the ABC 1 class was positive and
significant in Model 6 which suggests a probability of improvement in the economic
situation of a person from ABCl class relative to the other economic income
classes. Thus, the fact that the ABC l class is witnessing an improvement in its
economic situation indicates it might have a positive assessment of the role of these
funds on peace. Membership in the ABC 1 class increases the probability of
perceiving the contribution these funds make to the peace process by about 11
percent compared to the other two classes keeping all other things constant.
We observe that those in the ABC I professional class tend to see the
contribution to be more positive than those in the semi-skilled and skilled classes.
Another variable worth noting is the respondent's relation with the funding agency.
The negative coefficient indicates that there is a positive association between the
perceptions of a person towards the contribution of the cross community projects
funded by the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund to peacebuilding. It is
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worth remembering that the value of the variable "RELATION" is in descending
order, a large number means an unfavorable relation.
We have also conducted a joint test for political parties, class, and religion.
A joint test for the political party dummy variables demonstrates that the political
party affiliation identifiers arc jointly significant, even though not all individual
dummy variables for the respective political parties were statistically significant.
The interpretation of this result is that the party affiliation of respondents as a whole
is statistically significant in affecting the perception of the IFI and the EU Peace and
Reconciliation fund towards pcaccbuilding. With regards to the religion variables,
the coefficients were significant neither individually nor jointly. Hence, the
probability of perceiving the contribution of economic assistance to peacebuilding
does not vary by religious affiliation. Finally, a joint test for age groups shows that
the age variables were significant neither jointly nor individually.
Goodness of Fit
The log likelihood ratio which follows 2 is found to be large enough to
reject the null hypothesis of the coefficient vector, which is zero. In addition, the log
likelihood value at the globally optimal point is reported to be about -309. As it is
more common and more reasonable we report the power of our model using the Hit
and Miss table. Table 2 reports that the counted R 2 to be about 65 percent.

z

Specification Test
We have also conducted a normality test for the probit models. For these
tests we use the loglikelihood test as follows
-

ALR

~

a

= -2[Lr (,8)- Lur (,8)]~ x;

Note that the null hypothesis is the distribution of the error terms, which is normal.
The null hypothesis of normality test for Model 1 shows that the Arn is 0.56 so that
we do not reject the hypothesis. Thus, our probit model is justified. The same was
also done for Model 2 and Model 6. The results show that the null hypothesis is
rejected at less than the 1 percent level.
Perceived Effect ofIF/ and EU Peace and Reconciliation Fund on Violence
Using a binary response mode, this section analyses the response to the
following question: "do you believe IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund
economic support has helped in the reduction of violence?" The possible responses
are: "yes", "no" and "don't know." More specifically, we estimate a probit model
for the perceived contribution of the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund's
economic assistance on the reduction of violence. Model 2 in Table I presents the
results of this exercise. The dependent variable is a binary outcome, which assumes
0 if the response is "no," and 1 if the response is "yes." The probit equation in Table
l indicates that not all of the factors included in the regression analysis have a
significant effect on the perceived impact of economic assistance in reducing
violence in Northern Ireland.
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Gender: All things being equal, the probability of a male respondent perceiving a
positive role for the IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund's economic
assistance to reduce violence is lower by 14 percent than a female counterpart. All
things being equal the probability of a person from ABCl class perceiving a
positive role of IFI and EU financial assistance is higher than for a person from the
DE class. Our probit model suggest that the probability of rating the impact of the
IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation fund on the reduction of violence is negatively
associated with PUP, UK.UP, and Conservative Party affiliation.
The model has also a very good fit when we look at the overall predicted
probability in comparison with the observed probability. Its goodness of fit is
indeed remarkable while the observed and our predicted probabilities are 0.49 and
0.48 respectively. This gives the model more predicted capacity as it seems to fit the
data well. The hit and miss table shows that the counted R 2 is about 70 percent. A
specification test was also conducted to check if there is any fragility in our
estimates. The specification test shows that the results are indeed tenable to the
problem of endogeneity. We have also conducted a normality test by employing the
predicted values (x' /J) and (x' /J) 2 in our model to calculate the restricted and
unrestricted likelihood values. The likelihood test of normality does not reject the
null hypothesis of normality. As can be seen from the Hit and Miss table the
percentage of correctly classified responses in our model, the counted R square, is
about 70 percent. This is a remarkably high goodness of fit.
Discussion

Overall, the public opinion data suggest that economic assistance properly
administered may play a key role in fostering an environment conducive to the
peaceful resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict. Clearly, the respondents
recognized the link between prosperity and the fact that peace is the end of the long
war. The positive marginal effects of the minor political parties within Northern
Ireland--Conservative party and Women's Coalition party in Model 3 and 4 are
supportive of this argument. Thus, the role of economic assistance coupled with the
1998 GF A may be important in building peace over the long-term. Both
Governments built confidence building mechanisms into the GF A to reform the
police, decommission paramilitary arms, release prisoners, and withdraw
emergency legislation (Wilford, 2000). In 1994, the EU created the Special Support
Program for Peace and Reconciliation to support the political process and build the
peace dividend. In addition, the IFI's economic assistance and President Clinton's
visits to Northern Ireland resulted in the Catholic community and a slight majority
of Protestants support for the 1998 GF A (Byrne, 2002). Hence, the GF A will not
provide an immediate political solution to the deep-rooted causes of the Northern
Ireland conflict. In addition, the impact of both of these funds on the political
process may be negative as they might have had an adverse effect by further
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alienating already isolated Unionists. The negative marginal effects of the
respondents from the PUP and UUP, UKUP and DUP in Model I suggest that
Unionists do not perceive that the funds will build a lasting peace in Northern
Ireland. The GF A "is neither a solution to the Irish question nor a blueprint for
government, it is a framework to build consensus" (Cox, 1999, p. 66). By 2002,
only one-third of Protestants supported the GFA (MacGinty, 2003).
In the current climate Unionist mistrust of the peace process is indicative of
mainstream Unionist uneasiness over the decommissioning of Republican and
Loyalist arms, and prisoner release means less Unionist confidence in the GF A to
resolve the conflict (Aughey, 2000; Dixon, 2000). The negative marginal effects of
the PUP and UUP, UKUP and DUP in Model 1 are supportive of this argument.
The GF A includes the Unionist community negotiating with SF that it vilifies as
terrorists, and a SF who has abandoned support for political violence in pursuit of
the goal of a united Ireland that it has fought to achieve for over thirty years (Cox,
Guelke and Stephen, 2000, p.5).
Moreover, Honaker (2004) used available data to estimate the separate
. unemployment rates for Protestants and Catholics. He found that unemployment
leads to images of economic discrimination and is a significant causal mechanism
for the intensity of conflict in Northern Ireland. Catholics still remain twice as likely
to be long-term unemployed as Protestants (Byrne and Irvin, 2002). Currently,
Republicans traded the long war to be part of the political process of government in
Northern Ireland, to address human rights, policing, prisoner release, equality,
poverty and unemployment that marginalized Catholics in the past (Coakley, 2003;
Irvin and Byrne, 2002). In this study, we found that the probability that Catholics
will perceive the funded projects as very important to their community's economic
development is much lower than Protestants. Catholics, in particular, were excluded
and marginalized by the Unionists, and lacked material advantage. Moreover, it is
within the SF respondents in the survey that we see a belief in the positive role of
the funding agencies in addressing economic disadvantage, and in reducing the
levels of violence in Northern Ireland.
This finding is in contrast to that of the professional and skilled Unionist
classes where there is minimal support for the idea that economic assistance can
provide more economic opportunities and reduce the level of violence. The
Unionists rank the PIRA as the net beneficiary of the Troubles. Further, a lower
level of recognition of the existence of the EU Peace and Reconciliation fund by
Protestant respondents indicates that the lower level of applications for EU funding
in Protestant areas may be due to the lack of a local community infrastructure when
compared to the Catholic community. Moreover, fewer unemployed Protestants
compared to Catholics perceived the distribution of IFI funds between both
communities to be fair. This finding is noticeable when we compare the Unionist
with Nationalists. Protestants initially boycotted what they termed as IFI blood
money from America (Byrne, 2002).
In general, Protestants find the distribution of the IFI and EU Peace and
Reconciliation fund unfair. They perceive that Catholics are receiving all of the
benefits of both funds. This finding may also be related to the complexity of the
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume I 3, Number 2
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application process suggesting that the funds are escalating sectarian conflict rather
than transforming it. Similarly, a post-2003 Northern Ireland Election Survey found
that Unionists shared a strong belief that the 1998 GF A benefits Nationalists at the
expense of Unionists (Dowds, Hayes and McAllister, 2005). In other words,
Protestants perceive economic gains for Catholics as a deficit for their community
promoting sectarianism rather than cooperation. Unionists have a "historic culture
of fatalism, a culture of suspicions of the intentions of those outside that Unionist
family and even more suspicious of the intentions, even the best intentions of those
within it" (Aughey, 2000, p.185).
In 1994, the EU consulted with community groups in its development of the
peace package. Yet, far fewer respondents in this sample are aware of either EU or
IFI funded projects in their communities. The professional and skilled classes are
more aware of funded projects and both agencies. Perhaps the skills to access
economic assistance from the funding agencies remains confined to certain classes.
The amount of red tape hampering applications was certainly illustrated in other
studies of community group leader's attitudes toward the funding process (Byrne
and Ayulo, 1998; Byrne and Irvin, 2001, 2002) while funding agencies target the
areas of greatest needs. Thus, the funding agencies need to streamline the
application process to make it more user-friendly.
Fitzduff and O'Hagan (2002) make the point that economic assistance from
the EU Peace and Reconciliation fund has empowered the community sector in the
grassroots to work for constructive socioeconomic and political change and has
assisted in stabilizing the conflict in Northern Ireland. This point is not completely
convincing given the aforementioned results. Our findings tend to indicate that the
funds are only perceived to be beneficial to certain groups in the society.
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Conclusion
Even though the contribution of the IFI and EU in financial terms is
dwarfed by that coming from the British government they arc important as part of
engaging civil society in a multi-track intervention peace process. By examining the
role of external economic aid in Northern Ireland's polarized society, this article
suggests that peacebuilding is, as Byrne and Irvin (2002) put it, "a process
comprised of a multiplicity of interdependent roles, functions and activities as an
effective strategy to help resolve ethnic conflict" (p. 58). External economic
funding is one of several intervention activities that must be integrated into a
transdisciplinary strategy of conflict transformation enhanced by a coordinated,
multimodal, and complementarity approach at multiple levels of intervention (Byrne
2001 ab). Other activities that can contribute to conflict resolution include: citizen
empowerment and participatory democratic initiatives, cultural tradition initiatives,
education for mutual understanding, integrated education efforts, urban planning
peacekeeping strategies, mediation training, civic education, and a storytelling
process to address past traumas (Bollens, 2000; Byrne, 2001ab; Senehi 2000). "A
comprehensive peacebuilding approach creates, therefore, a critical space or
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landscape that builds upon people in their own setting" (Lederach, 1997, p. 12).
Only a transformational approach to conflict resolution can empower members of
ethnic groups sufficiently to reduce conflict. A multi-modal and transdisciplinary
approach to conflict resolution that encompasses and draws from every approach
can produce rapid change in societies tom by conflict and empower citizens (Byrne
and Keashly, 2000).
Economic assistance as part of a multi-track intervention process within the
political framework of the GF A has the potential to build a lasting peace in
Northern Ireland. Ultimately, the power of the GFA, its potential, and its constraints
can all be found within the roots of its purpose. "There may be quibbling about the
(GFA's) institutional superstructure but if it is going to succeed it will be because of
the values which form its foundations" (Thompson, 1999, p. 263). Indeed, the
importance of the GFA's emphasis on consent, diversity, parity of esteem, and
commitment to exclusively peaceful means cannot be overstated, because fear
motivates violence (Thompson, 1999). The GF A is functional because it seeks to
directly resolve fear. It aims to bring to an end an ethnic conflict by reassuring the
two communities that they have a right to their identity (Thompson, 1999).
The GF A cannot transform into a sustainable peace accord without further
progress by the political parties because it has failed to significantly impact hostile
relationships and attitudes, and has not aided in the demise of political polarity
(MacGinty 2003). However, the overarching lesson here is that at least in the case
of protracted ethnopolitical conflict no treaty, document or economic assistance
package on its own can transform societies plagued by ethnic violence as the work
toward the resolution of these conflicts can only occur through genuine discussions
and communication (Byrne, 2000). But the responsibility belongs to the political
parties, and the GF A has at least built them a vehicle to get to peace.
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Abstract

The present analysis focuses on the personal narratives of peace activists, the
facilitators of reconciliation-aimed dialogues between two ethno-national groups in
a situation of asymmetrical conflict: Jews and Palestinians. It puts .forward the idea
that these peace activists bring a wealth of knowledge from their personal and
professional narratives to bear on their strategies and practices of social
transformation. We posit that .foregrounding this knowledge through the analysis of
these narratives not only afford,;; a better understanding of their theoretical
perspectives, their practices, aims and goals of social change but also can greatly
contribute to our better understanding ofpeace education processes in general and
in particular to a consideration of the ways peace activists experience and
creatively deal with the dilemmas and challenges they confront in their
transformational work.
Introduction

The present analysis focuses on the personal narratives of peace activists,
the facilitators of reconciliation-aimed dialogues between two ethno-national groups
in a situation of asymmetrical conflict. It puts forward the idea that these peace
activists bring a wealth of knowledge from their personal and professional
narratives to bear on their strategies and practices of social transformation. We posit
that foregrounding this knowledge through the study of these narratives not only
affords a better understanding of their theoretical perspectives, their practices, aims
and goals of social change but also can greatly contribute to our better
understanding of peace education processes in general and in particular to a
consideration of the ways peace activists experience and creatively deal with the
dilemmas and challenges they confront in their transformational work.
Theoretical Background

Ask almost anyone in Israel, Jew (Ashkenazi or Sephardic, right, center or
left) or Palestinian (Moslem or Christians, right, center or left), if they wish for a
peaceful coexistence and they will all answer a positive yes. The problem is that all
three words 'peaceful' 'coexistence' and 'yes' are not always interpreted the same
way, nor is their meaning reachable, even when agreed upon, through the same
path. As with many (all) other words, these words are always in the way somewhere
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and their meaning is shaped ever anew by the complex sociopolitical context in
which they need to make sense.
Social scientists, policy makers, and peace activists have been working for
the last three decades (Maoz, 2004; W ciner, 1998) to develop, test, and implement
social transformation strategics which might help reconciliatory processes.
Dialogical encounters are, for the most part, the preferred strategy to improve
relations and mutual perceptions between groups in conflict (Bar-On & Kassem,
2004; Bar, Barga!, & Asaqla, 1995; Kelman, 1998; Salomon & Nevo, 2002). The
use of facilitated transformativc dialogue encounters between groups in conflict
follows from the assumption that ethnopolitical conflicts tend to be accompanied by
psychological phenomena such as mutual prejudice, deligitimization, and
dehumanization (Bar-On & Kassem, 2004; Bar-Tai, 2000).
Of the many studies that have been conducted on transformative intergroup
dialogues, the majority have focused on attitudinal change based on pre and post
measures (Abu-Nimer, 1999; Bar, Barga!, & Asaqla, 1995; Gaertner, Dovidio, &
Bachman, 1997; Wood & Soleitner, 1996) and have paid little attention to
developmental issues. Only recently have qualitative methodologies started to be
implemented towards a better understanding of transformative group processes and
have subsequently offered insights into some of the characteristic practices and
dynamics which develop in the dialogic events bringing into light power struggles
and intrinsic and extrinsic influences (Bar-on, 1999; Bar-On & Kassem, 2004;
Bekerman, 2002; Halabi & Sonnenschcin, 2004; Katz & Kahanov, 1990; Maoz,
2000; Maoz, 2004; Salomon & Nevo, 2002). But for one exception (Nevo,
Salomon, & Brem, 2002) no studies have yet been undertaken to try and better
understand the perspectives and goals of those so central to the intergroup
encounter, the peace activists/facilitators who organize and lead them.
The present study, situated within a narrative and dialogical
perspective, is innovative in that it focuses on the experiences, goals and
perceptions of those who lead these transformative dialogues - the Jewish and
Palestinian peace activists and group facilitators. Through their personal narratives
we try to better understand their vicissitudes when involved in challenging
intergroup activities, their potential to effect change in the relations between the
sides involved, and the strategies they implement.
In many fields concerned with human experience, theoretical developments
over the past few decades have become axiomatic, suggesting that people order
their lives through narrative (Bruner, 1987, 1990; Freeman, 1993, 1997; MacIntyre,
1981; McAdams, 1990; Polkinghome, 1988). Narrative theory posits that individual
and group existence are experienced and explained as a sequential story which
combines multiple and complex paths of development (Josselson & Lieblich, 1993;
Riessman, 1993). Narratives have also been conceptualized as exercising social
control (Mumby, 1993) and as being instrumental in reproducing societal cultural
constructs. Van Dijk (1993, 1996) envisions them as stories, episodic or situation
models, or mental representations of events or actions taking place in a specific
social situation. According to this theory, people continuously engage in the process
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of rebuilding these models according to the constrains of context. These models
play a role both during discourse production and in discourse comprehension.
Life is said to become explicit in stories (Widdershoven, 1993) and many
scholars suggest we create ourselves and our identities through narratives (FisherRosenthal, 2000; MacIntyre, 1981; McAdams, 1990). Brunner ( 1986)
conceptualizes narratives as providing individuals with a map of possible roles and
trajectories where actions become possible. Polkinghorne (1988) points at
individual narratives as the elements which allow for the construction of a sense of
being in present and future, while offering at a cultural level the option to create a
sense of shared values and common beliefs.
Within the educational research literature there is a rather long tradition of
investigation regarding teachers' characteristics and individual perceptions
(Carnahan, 1980; Clandinin, 1989; Doyle & Carter, 2003). More recently
educational scholars have shifted their interests to individual teachers' perspectives
and understandings of educational processes and accordingly have begun to explore
teachers' perceptions within more socially negotiated perspectives (Britzman, 1991;
Casey, 1993; Chan, 2006; Marsh, 2002).
Though the subjects of our present paper are not what could traditionally be
understood as teachers we will adopt a similar approach which we believe is
justifiable on two accounts. First, when considering the existence of educational
goals to be mediated (through information management), the participants and the
social settings within which the encounters take place, peace activists' work as
facilitators is in many ways similar to that undertaken by teachers in traditional
educational settings. Second, the scarcity or total lack of research on the
characteristics and individual perceptions of facilitators involved in transformative
intergroup encounters makes it of utmost importance to try and better understand
what those so central to the intergroup encounters perceive as their aims, tasks, and
obstacles in the dialogic encounter world. Our overall efforts is geared towards
better understanding these peace activists' own perception of encounters, given the
cultural resources (Neuman & Bekerman, 2001) they have available to make sense
of their work in the complex world in which it evolves.
Our interpretative efforts focus on the centrality of concepts such as
discourse and power. By discourse we point at the historically, politically, and
socially, generated patterns of speaking and acting upon which individuals draw so
as to attain meaningful communication (Fairclough, 1989; Gee, 1999).
Simultaneously we emphasize the study of relevant knowledge, ideologies and other
socially shared beliefs which is crucial in describing many of the properties and
social functions of discourse (Van Dijk, 2006).
By power we point at the relational phenomenon that is continually being
constituted and reconstituted as individuals move in and out of particular sets of
relations (Foucault, 1980). Stories have persuasive functions and contribute to the
reproduction of knowledge, Beliefs, attitudes, ideologies, norms, or values of a
group or of society as a whole help sustain a given order as they are used to inform
people or to tell the code of institutions and their inherent power relations. Thus

Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2
- 24 -

How Do We Educate for Peace?

stories become essential in the maintenance and legitimization of dominant power
and ideologies.
The notions of dialogic meaning and heteroglosia developed by Bakhtin
(1981) and his school can help us understand the multi-voiced nature of all
communicative efforts. In his analysis Bakhtin explores the differences in a variety
of speaking genres as a means to dialogue among disparate groups revealing how
authors speak not through a unitary voice but rather through the multiple voices of
his or her characters. In this sense dialogue is not something which only happens
between people and with language but also something which 'essentially' takes place
within people and the dialogues they sustain with their memory and experience their previous interactions and social experiences. Bakhtin not only addresses the
inner dialogue of an author as expressed in the heteroglossia of the novel but also
points at the heteroglossia of an author and his epoch. This social heteroglossia also
known as the inherently intertextuality and intcrdiscursive nature of social
interaction is not only a feature of novelistic writing but a feature of the world as it
is expressed in its every day activity (Billig, 1987; Todorov, 1984; Van Dijk, 1996).
In our analysis we specially point at what we believe is uncovered in the peace
activists
/facilitators
narratives
with
regard
to
the
hctcroglossia/intertextuality/intcrdiscursivc nature of their accounts as these arc
generated and shaped in the context of Jewish-Palestinian relations of power. In
short we try and point at the socio-historical resources with which each peace
activist seems to dialogue when conceptualizing his transformational work.
Given the centrality of the socio-historical context to any understanding of
inter-textual inter-discursive perspectives, in the following section we try to render a
concise, yet incisive account of the present situation in Israel given its historical
evolution.
The socio-political context
Currently the Palestinian population within the internationally recognized
borders of Israel is 20% and the Jewish citizens account for about 78% of the
population (Israel, 200 I) of Israel. Approximately 10% of the Palestinian population
of Israel lives in mixed cities (in mostly segregated neighborhoods), while the
majority of Palestinian Israelis live in segregated villages or small cities (Ghanem,
2001).
Since its inception, as is clearly stated in its Declaration of Independence,
Israel has been committed to full political and social equality for all its citizens
irrespective of their religion or ethnic affiliation. Still, even the Israeli government
acknowledges that it has not been fully successful in implementing this ideal and
has, for the most part, implemented segregationist policies towards its non-Jewish
minorities. These policies have only recently began to be challenged in the courts of
justice (Gavison, 2000).
These separatist policies were, for the most part, ad hoc arrangements,
products of the military emergencies which accompanied Israel's development from
the beginning of the Zionist colonializing process over one hundred years ago.
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Though the outcomes are varied, they are most visible not only on residential
arrangements but also on educational segregated systems (Rouhana, 1997).
The relationships between Palestinians and Jews within Israel have been
strongly influenced by the Palestinian Israeli conflict which, in tum, has profoundly
influenced the formation of Palestinian identity within the borders of the Israeli
state. The Palestinian presence in the State of Israel and the awakening of
Palestinian national consciousness has complicated the seemingly natural construct
of the Israeli nation. The Jewish-Palestinian conflict remains the most explosive
conflict in Israel, placing the Jewish majority and the Palestinian (primarily
Muslim) minority at perpetual odds.
The development of Palestinian identity in Israel has gone through various
stages tightly connected to their sense of citizenship and the situation of the Israeli
state in international politics. In the years after the 1948 war, Palestinians were
perceived as a threat by Jewish Israel, and suffered from military governance with
its many restrictions on their civil rights. All Palestinian municipal, educational,
social, and religious institutions were supervised to prevent the emergence of
centers of power (Ghanem, 2001; Rekhess, 1988). Such supervision, though
somewhat relaxed, continues today. Since 1967, with the incremental abolishment
of the military governance, major changes have taken place. Today Palestinian
Israelis have gathered enough strength to be able to challenge the Israeli Jewish
hegemony while changing their self-identity from Israeli-Arab to Palestinian
(Halabi & Sonnenschein, 2004; Rouhana, 1998; Suleiman, 2004). This process of
change was supported by the uprising of their brethren in the conquered territories.
In spite of the structural differences which limit their civil rights, constraining them
to a position of second class citizens by denying them equal access to economic,
political, and social resources, most Palestinians in Israel say they would rather stay
in Israel than move to a Palestinian state if one were established (Smooha, 1998).
Palestinians in Israel experience Israel as a Jewish "ethnic" state, and not a
democracy (Ghanem, 1998; Rouhana, 1998) and from their perspective Israel is a
colonizing state which confiscated their lands (Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis, 1995). For
the most part, Israel's ethnic democracy (Smooha, 1996) has not welcomed the
political, cultural or social participation of groups outside of its legitimate,
imagined, community (Anderson, 1991) of Jews. Palestinian-Israelis, though
officially offered full rights as citizens, have chronically suffered as a putatively
hostile minority with little political representation and a debilitated social, economic
and educational infrastructure (Ghanem, 1998). While structurally the communities
reflect a sharp asymmetry, their perceptions of the situation are similar. Both sides
believe they have a monopoly on the objective truth of the conflict and on the
identification of the perpetuating villain. These perceptions undermine the prospects
for conflict resolution (Bar-Tai, 1990, 1998).
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Methods

Population
Of the 24 peace activist-facilitators interviewed 12 were Palestinians and 12 Jewish.
All participants interviewed have a rather long standing experience working, for the
most part in full time positions, in inter-group Palestinian Jewish encounters in
established organizations. Of the Palestinians five where male and seven female,
and among Jews four were male and eight female. All Palestinians where born in
the recognized boundaries of Israel and out of the 12 Jews three males and four
females immigrated to Israel. All facilitators held at least a bachelors degree mostly
in the areas of the humanities and the social sciences. The youngest interviewee was
27 years old and the oldest 55. The facilitators were interviewed between October
2004 and May 2005 in the framework of a research project conducted at the Truman
Institute for the Advancement of Peace, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and
led by the first two authors. The central aim of the project was to reassess the
potential benefits of inter-group encounters aimed at peace education. All of the
peace activists were facilitators involved in dialogue initiatives conducted by a
variety of private institutions for high school. These seminars partially supported by
the Ministry of education run from one to three days and are conducted in retreat
settings. All facilitators had participated in training programs offered by the same
institutions responsible for the encounters programs which run weekly sessions for a
period that usually extends between 3 or 4 months to one school year.
The research team included the three authors and five advanced students in areas
related to peace education, and conflict resolution (two Israeli-Jews, 1 Palestinian, 2
Germanii).
Methodology
In-depth interviews of one to two hours in length were conducted with
participants in English at a location of their choice. One interview was conducted in
German at the request of the interviewee. All interviews were recorded and
carefully transcribed for analysis. A grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss,
1967) was utilized stressing the importance of discovering theories, concepts,
hypothesis, and propositions directly from the data rather than from a priori
assumptions or an existing theoretical framework.
The transcripts were analyzed according to conventional qualitative
methods (Mason, 1996; Silverman, 1993). Our first interpretative efforts were
monitored through peer debriefing, paying special attention to the ways in which
we, as researchers, allowed or hindered preliminary coding to be influenced by our
prior expectations or theoretical inclinations. We carefully analyzed the data,
looking for patterns and thematic issues of relevance, which were then coded as to
allow for further analysis. The first codification, prepared independently by each of
the researchers involved, raised multiple categories which needed to be narrowed
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down for further analysis. A second reading of all the recorded materials allowed us
to systematically reduce the categories by combining like terms and eliminating
redundant ones. High levels of agreement between the coders were reached after
thorough discussions (Glassner & Loughlin, 1987). In the present manuscript, so as
to enable a more fluid reading of the texts cited from the interviews, we have at
times slightly changed the citations from the transcripts. In our following "findings"
section we present first rather long excerpts from two interviews (first a Jewish
interview and then a Palestinian one) which we judge to be exemplary as they allow
in depth analysis of the structures and strategies that manipulate the attitudes,
ideologies, norms and values that are ultimately in the interest of the dominant
group. This consequently shows the relevance of a socio-cognitive interface
between narrative discourse and dominance allowing a parallel between macro-level
notions such as group dominance and inequality and micro-level notions as text,
talk, meaning and understanding. Following this section we mention in short how
our full analysis of all interviews support these first findings .

Findings
In our interviews we asked participants to share with us what we
conceptualized as being two trajectories a personal and a professional one. We
hoped to find interlacing conceptualizations and similarities and differences at the
individual level, within national/ethnic groups and across these groups. The results
of our research validated out expectations and hopefully these findings will be
demonstrated to flow from the narratives our participants offered more than from
our own imposition. In qualitative approaches, those that follow the line of
ethnographic inquiry closely connected to the anthropological tradition - the
discipline of the anecdotal veto- generalization is anathema. Still we have chosen to
focus at first on two narratives, one Palestinian and one Jewish, belonging to two
male interviewees, relatively similar in age, education, training and experience in
the educational inter-group encounter field. Our analysis of all the interviews
generated, added to our rather long experience of inquiry in the field of inter-group
encounters, cause us to believe that the themes raised in their accounts are in many
ways representative of the experiences shared by many other facilitators involved in
these educational initiatives.
A Jewish Trajectory
Yaron seems to be a 'prototypical Zabar' (the 'new Jew' of the Zionist
revolution). He was born in Ramat Gan (in the costal central part of Israel) over
thirty years ago. His mother was a teacher in a segregated Jewish high school and
his father was a high ranking army officer (a pilot in the Israeli aviation force). Both
ofYaron's parents were born in Kibbutzim and both left at a rather early age. Yaron
defines them as being "very Zionist" because "of the way they were brought up."
The family included two younger children, a sister and a brother. Yaron spend a
year in the USA with his family; "my father was send to study there at the marine
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academy in Washington ... " and except for this fact Yaron considers his childhood
as "very normal, I guess Israeli way, kinda in a city, uh school, high school (line,
23) .. .I got the same kind of um Zionist affection from them (the parents) .. .I
imagine school was less um dogmatic . ..but I still was on the same direction .. ..there
was no question of becoming an officer in the army (lines, 29-32)"
Yaron politically characterizes his family as "center left" and remembers
the traditional family gatherings with his uncles and aunts, "it was always politics
on the table." He is somewhat critical of their position: "from where I see it now,
(they had) very close opinions ... nothing radical (lines, 34-39)." In the nineties
Yaron joined the army, and he quickly mentions that he only spent "a short period
when I was sent to the occupied territories for three weeks (lines, 46-47)." Prior to
this stint in the occupied territories, Yaron had been in flight school for a year but
had not succeeded to become a pilot as his father had. During the three weeks in the
territories Yaron was asked to take upon himself some military tasks a check point
that made him feel uncomfortable, "I was unprepared perhaps ... and I started asking
questions (line, 56)." Luckily he was moved to another setting which allowed this
uncomfortable sentiment to "kinda fade away (line, 66)." Yaron stayed in the army
for five years becoming an officer. "I was in the army until '96, I spent five and half
years there. But from '94 it was the Oslo period and all that talk and 1 um, I stopped,
when I finished my military service I thought that I want to be involved in the peace
process. Like I was always, I was always uh, taught, or to think about Israel and
about the State and about society and this seemed like the most interesting thing
happening and um and I would even say to myself that the same as my father went
to the army twenty, thirty years ago for that reason then I'm going to work for the
State, on peace. This is like the most important thing to do (lines, 75-83)." In order
to do this, Yaron decided to study Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University
where he also studied Arabic.
Y aron, though he had encountered Palestinians at check points during his
army service, mentions that until he reached university he had never actually met
Palestinians: "I understood that I had never met a Palestinian, I had never met an
Arab and that was kinda a revealing thought for me. Um, I think like the left is, the
left political wing is thought to think about the, I mean it's very clear that they are
other, uh and they have very negative, um, um, like um, marks on them, negative,
um characteristics . .. yeah, characteristics. Um. Like Oriental. All that kind of, the
way Europeans look at um, Arabs. Yeah. Um. People are very politically correct but
basically I think, yeah (lines 85-103)." He mentioned making a couple of "clumsy
attempts" to meet Palestinians at the University and that through an advertisement
posted at the university decided to join a facilitators course for intergroup
encounters in order to meet Palestinians in a formal setting.
Yaron was profoundly impacted by this facilitators' course and it was
through this course that he realized that the Palestinians are "not something that can
be wiped under the carpet" and began to perceive himself as previously being
"kinda of a fascist (line 13 1)." Only at this point does Y aron start to understand the
power of the "Palestinian identity ... the existence of it (till this point) I was thinking
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in terms of equality like ... I think ... most of the left wing in Israel used to talk .. .I
was going through an amazing experience (lines, 135-138)." Yaron's first
experience at the facilitators course was transformativc: "it was perhaps a mirror on
my society, in general of the way .. .I idealized the state ... I saw people who live in
the same area and think totally different .. .I remember their stories about the Shabak
(the Israeli security services) ... my father was in the army .. .it brought things about
Israel being a ... moral society ... I started going politically into a period where I
didn't have any answers .. .I was very uncomfortable with Zionism and I was
. .. (lines 158-170)."
In the next section of the interview Yaron relates to the educational
activities he conducted after he finished the facilitation training period. He shortly
tells about the high school intergroup encounters he facilitated and describes their
basic structure. He is very clear about what truly interests him in the intergroup
dialogues. "Yeah. I'm mostly interested in the Jewish group um so that's, when I
say it was a good workshop it means that uh, I felt that the Jewish group that I was
working with uh was able to understand (the right questions), the important, the
important thing I want to do is to help them start the process that I passed. Uh,
looking back at their identity, understanding that uh, (I mean) stop living in the way
that I lived up until the age of 26 (lines, 224-231 ). "
The uni-national meetings conducted during encounter seminars seem to be
the component of the seminars that in Yaron's view, best serve his goals. During
these sessions, participants are able to open up and question things that otherwise
might go unstated, for example, considerations regarding the possibility of having a
Jewish democratic state and the Law of Return (which offers immediate citizens
rights to Jews immigrating to Israel). Yaron emphasizes that Jewish participants
coming to these activities have little knowledge about some very central facts and
that central to the activity is "letting them know about all these things (line, 44)." He
mentions specifically the fact that while participants initially oppose the "right of
return" (the right of refugee Palestinians to return to their lands taken in the 1948
war) they know little about what this is. Furthermore during the 'simulation' - one of
the final activities in the seminar where Palestinians and Jews discuss the future of
the state of Israel after peace has been achieved - while rather easily accepting the
return of Palestinians the Jewish participants soon realize this would mean the end
of the Jewish State and then reconsider their positions. It is this reflective process aided by the facilitators - which Yaron believes to be the central contribution of the
intergroup seminar toward Jewish participants .
Y aron also believes Palestinian participants have what to gain but he raises
this issue only when asked about an opportunity when 'things' at the seminar do not
go well. " ... basically it's a very strong, it's a very good technique (the seminar) uh,
it's a very good uh, but I think sometimes, uh like first of all the problem is there is
a difference in the group in terms of education, or, I don't want to use the word
mentality but I'll use it because I can't find another. .. (lines, 252-257)." Yaron tries
to better explain the misused word and adds "(the) Palestinian group was ... had a,
had a very hard time expressing themselves. Perhaps it was the kids in the class who
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were not very bright or uh, the questions they were asked to think about were also
very new to them. Like, the possibility of changing the nature of the State was
something they had never even been asked (lines, 259-262)." He believes Christian
Palestinians want to melt into the Israeli Jewish society and that in general "The
Jewish group gets frustrated because the two groups are at different places. The
Jews are all ready to go into dialogue of conflict and the Palestinian group is not,
doesn't, needs some more time uh, to stabilize its identity (lines, 277-280)." Yaron
realizes the complexities of co-facilitating with Palestinian peers. He is an exception
in that he speaks rather fluent Arabic, though he is aware that his Arabic literacy is
limited and that he cannot understand everything, especially when colloquialisms
are in central to the discussion. Still his situation is better than that of many other
facilitators, most of whom do not understand Arabic at all and are embarrassed to
"ask for translation" throughout the seminar, especially at the end of the seminar
when the final arguments are made by the facilitation team. He well understands
this asymmetry, which in his view primarily affords the Palestinian facilitator a
more central place in the educational process, for he is doing most of the talking both translating for the Jews and facilitating for the group as a whole.
Yaron believes that Jewish facilitators bare a "guilt factor" and that in their
relations to their groups the Jewish and Palestinian facilitators do not share the same
lot. "The Palestinian facilitator would be much more comfortable uh defending the
Palestinian group. While the Jewish facilitator usually kind of wants to, to shape the
Jewish group. He would be sometimes uncomfortable, there are times when he has
to defend the group (lines, 323-326)." When asked for an example he mentions "If
things are said, you know, in tone that is not uh appropriate or people are being
accused in a, ( ) minutes where you have to, and I think it is much easier for
(Palestinians) to do that work and to, Jewish they always have problems, they are
not sure (lines, 328-331 ). "
A more specific example offered relates to language use in the encounters
"Language for instance, we have this thing that we always when we have uh binational group we would start by speaking Arabic to the audience. This is kind of to
shake the power relations from the beginning. And uh what happens usually to a
Jewish audience that comes to a room and suddenly hears a lecture in Arabic, in
other words from two minutes up to ten minutes, it is very disturbing. Sometimes I
think there is a place for uh, I mean you shouldn't, you shouldn't go too much with
that. I mean you should put a, perhaps explain sometime, translate, and on the one
side its common that its uh, it's the right of the Palestinian facilitators to speak in
Arabic. It's their right. On the other hand if they speak in Arabic most of the Jewish
facilitators will not understand (lines, 334-346)."
Later in the interview Yaron mentions some other problems he perceives in
some of the encounters. "Generally, yeah. If there was a lot of kind of like this is
something that is kind of very common, the Palestinian boys would kind of,
sometimes, would not be very, would be very compromising and like, and usually
with uh Jewish girls (lines, 372-375)."
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Y aron ends the interview recollecting on his own present situation "I'm not
a Zionist any more, My vision is of a bi-national state. So personally I have changed
a lot. .. .it happened in the Intifda ... having Palestinain friends telling me somebody
died in the village (lines, 405-412)." But he adds "I still do reserve army service . . .I
wouldn't go to the west bank but I still do reserve army service (lines 418-431 )."
A Palestinian Trajectory
Khalid seems to be a 'prototypical Palestinian' born in the 'Jewish
Democratic' State of Israel. He was born to a family with twelve children (six boys
and six girls), in a rather big Palestinian segregated village in the north of Israei
where "I finished high school. .. more or less my life was around that town and the
school there (lines, 17-19)". During the school holidays he used to work "for Jewish
farmers and other times in construction also in Jewish towns and neighborhoods
(lines, 20-21 ). " Under these conditions he first crossed the limits of his home town.
He summarizes his early encounters with Jews by saying, "I mentioned earlier I
started to work when I was really young .. .and sometimes going to some of the
nearby cities for fun ... that was my day-to-day encounter with the Jews when
basically this encounter was asymmetric, unequal. .. if it was at work so ... well the
Jews was to be the boss and .. .I was the worker or even going to, you know, to-to
any place just to have fun it have never been like really .. .like a feeling of you
have .. .to keep down the all the time and at one time I really had very not nice racist
occasion that. . .like it was a slash in my face, like a/ you know, like at-to know who
you are and where you are, in which country, who you are dealing with so that was
like my first shock I think that when I was maybe fourteen or fifteen this happened
to me (lines, 54-63)".
The racist event Khalid mentions is too long to include in its entirety in this
text. It relates to an incident that occurred while spending a day at the beach, in
which a Jewish person stole his dog from him. What is central to his narrative is
what he seems to have understood from this event: "(the lifeguard) refused to help
us .. . it was a shock for me that all these people around, nobody cared .. .and all of
them were ready to help this guy steal my dog ... (lines, 95-99)" .
Khalid relates a second encounter with the Jews, one although unrelated to
Khalid's specific encounter, which our previous interviewee also implied. "In (my
village) it's like a big high school of it was only one high school and so the whole
town went to this high school.. . and I was the head of the student's council and a
guy from the town came to my father and said: well, listen, this guy from the
Shabak (Israeli Secret Service), from the secret services wants to talk to your son,
Khalid, and I suggest that he talks to him because he's a nice guy, he can help .. .I
don't think that you can really refuse because he can be hurt if you refuse but he
also can help Khalid ... his name is Avi, and he was/ and his nickname is Abu
Suleiman, he's Ashkenazi and he spoke Arabic better than me ... my older brother
had the honor to know A vi as well (and) my father was really scared because he
wanted (Avi) talk older brother (to meet with Avi) although my older brother did
not agree to ... my older brother was not able to get into university ... I believe
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because he did not have good scores, good grades. My father still believes that
because the Shabak ... (my father) he's from the generation of the Nag be, of the
catastrophe of forty-eight, so this-s why he's very afraid and still has the memories
of the Diaspora and maybe of the ... So my father spoke ... You do whatever you
want (he said) but I understood that my father wants me to meet with him, with this
guy, because he is afraid that this guy can hurt me ... one day, one winter day at two
o'clock after midnight this guy from the town came to our house, knocked at our
door, we were all aslecp ... my father was really he didn't know who's knocking
... and was this guy from the town. And my father says: What do you want? And he
said: 1 came to take Khalid to meet with Abu Suleiman, with Avi. And (my father)
said: Why now? It's (two o'clock?) And he said: Well, it's better now, nobody secs
us, it's not good that people see us going together to this guy. He convinced my
father that it's the best time and I felt kind of a 1 was already prepared, by some of
my friends, little older friends who had such, like relatively similar experience, so I
said: Well, I'll go! A-and I'll see what it leads to. I was seventeen years old (lines,
13 2-171)". The meeting, described by Khalid, includes all that can be expected from
a meeting with the secret service. A somewhat dark small room, good and bad guys,
a long interrogation and many more details which would make Hollywood films
sound real. It took place in an "Arab house .. .in Haifa" and Khalid characterizes the
investigation as "a very sophisticated one (and) kind of romantic scary ... following
the path of the stick and the carrot." He is told by Avi in great detail some of his
daily activity with peers, girls, and even details of conversations "We can know
everything!" Avi says. Avi just wants Khalid to cooperate in exchange he offers
help with Khalid's studies, finding work, and even an allowance. Khalid ends this
story joking about this, his first encounter with the state: "So, this was my first
serious encounter with Jewish people at fifteen (the stolen dog), this was (laughs)
my first encounter with the State of Israel as-as an institution, when I was seventeen
(lines, 321-323)."
All in all Khalid is well aware that his own group cooperates in creating the
sense that "Arabs are less" he says "Whenever a Jew came to my town, one of my
relatives or my neighbors, or whatever, no matter who he is or she is and what
qualifications they have or how clever they are, how stupid they arc, or whatever
everybody will feel obliged to satisfy them. They'll make like everything to make
this Jewish guests satisfied. And you will find a whole neighbourhood busy
satisfying him and everybody would come to say hello to them and shake their
hands. So, it's like God came to your neighborhood, if you have relations to Jewish
people you arc considered to be important person, you have ... you have relations,
you are connected. And no matter who ... who this Jewish is. So this, all this feel as
if or if you know how to speak Hebrew, you are considered to be significant. Even
if you worked for a Jew, ok, as a black worker, no matter what and you said every
morning: Good morning/ good morning, Sir ... Ok, we used to say adoni
(master/sir). To-to when we worked for them I would say adoni. That's the word we
used. You were considered to be benefited because you have these contacts. So all
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of them messages you get through your life experience, that you're worth less that
you are one . .. one class below and ... (lines, 350-365)."
Khalid also had other encounters with Jews in the form of organized
Palestinian-Jewish encounters, which he participated in while at school. These
encounters were offered by the NGO where he was ultimately trained as a facilitator
before he started his university studies of Sociology and Education. His
recollections of these seminars are very positive, not so much because of the Jews in
them but because of the self-realization that Palestinians need not only represent
serfdom. He recounts, "And 1 was very enthusiastic through this project, wanted
very much to become a facilitator. I adored the facilitators. I had the feeling that
they have a lot of power and especially the Palestinian facilitators, they were kind of
personality. I liked the way I grew out of-of being non-personality in front of... of a
Jew. And I saw then that, you know, they are fluent in Hebrew they are selfconfident they had a say about everything happening and they lead sometimes and
that was total, you know, total out of(?) for me (lines, 31-38)." Later Khalid was
invited to participate in a facilitators' course at the NGO. He liked the idea of this
opportunity and justifies his choice with the following: "Of course, that was kind of
a dream for me at that time just to be out of the town and-and be by myself for the
first time, I grew in big family we are twelve children. Six boys and six-six boys
and six girls. I never had a-a room of myself I never even had, you know like a
cupboard of myself to put my things, my clothes and ... so the idea of having a room
by myself without having to share it with somebody else and be away from my
parents and be independent (lines, 453-49)."
A year after finishing the facilitators' course and with some experience
working in the encounters Khalid started studying at a university and again tells of
encounters with Jews during this latter period in his life. Khalid comments on the
fact that university studies are considered "our army service" and adds that the focus
of the first year of university of any Palestinian student "is English without which
there is no chance to continue." Because of the experience he gained through the
facilitators' course, his English, and almost more importantly, his Hebrew were
better then most other Palestinian university students. Khalid notes that he formed
more friendships with American Jews than with Israeli Jewish students because by
this time making friends with "Israelis" was becoming very difficult for him. Not
having Israeli Jews as friends at the university meant that he did not have the
opportunity to get classroom notes from those for whom the class was conducted in
their native language (OR mother tongue), Hebrew. The notes were necessary
because Kahlid had to make as much time in his schedule in order to work to
financially support his studies.
Khalid believes Jews respected him at the university. ''I'll tell ... so they
have this kind of feeling of yirat kavod of respect kind of a respect fear, ok, I and ...
I think for many of them, for most of them it was unusual to meet Palestinian Arab
and it was during the time I was living here and, yeah, I became secretary general of
the community here, so I was really, I have like a strong self-esteem. And I would
behave at university like I behaved here, I give orders to everybody here and kind of
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boss here (lines, 458-462)." But this experience of relative power is accompanied by
other experiences better known to Khalid from his past "I think stories like this tells
this how-how these things work, so in one of my classes I ... one of the guys who
was every morning was sitting next to me and we never really had chance to talk,
maybe good morning, that's more or less I don't really have much time .. .and this
guy came to me and said: Good morning, how are you, how you fell today? and so
on - ok, good, ok, I thought he was wondering ... he's trying to, you know to open
conversation with me or make me relaxed because maybe he thinks I'm tense of the
situation (because it was immediately after a bomb exploded in the cafeteria of the
university) or, you know ... I have an old hebushit, (old Volkswagen) and I want to
renovate it and people told me there are good garages in Wadi Choz (garage area in
east Jerusaelm). Do you know them? And I was think if I look at him like, you
know ... I continue to drink. See, no, I'm I thought maybe you know, you have
contact, maybe you can you know take me to somebody and . .. I'm looking at him,
again. No, I'm sorry, I didn't really mean it, I just, you know, I just wanted to have
coffee with you and . ... (I thought) an Arab for him was the garage, you know? Ok,
so when he saw my face, he saw a garage ... he saw a person, he's saying but of
course he did not mean like, you know, this things happens without any intention,
you know, but he thought like I would be the garage person, I am the person to take
him to the garage, to a cheap garage or whatever but without not it doesn't meet the
expectations, doesn't meet that stereotypical Arab Palestinian .. .(lines, 482-496)."
Khalid also reflected on his perceptions in the encounters he facilitates. He finds it
difficult to explain why he believes them to be transformative: "It's very difficult for
me to describe (line, 552)." Still, in spite of this difficulty to articulate the process
he says, "I want people to have in their way an experience . ..a chance of an
experience kind of what I have gone through (lines, 555-556)." He surprisingly
sounds ambivalent about the outcomes "is it enough that they become empowered?
because I can see also by the end of an encounter the Arab-Palestinian students are
very frustrated. They say: "We came here, we talked, nothing has changed, we go
back to the same situation. But at the same time they tell about very much
satisfaction from the encounter, so it's frustration and satisfaction at the same time
(lines, 560-565)." This ambivalence regarding the effects of the encounter brings
him to consider his future. He begins this section of the interview by saying: "By
the way the Palestinian community in Israel is very tribal community, until today
(line 567)." He indicates that in the future "I think it's a time when I will feel secure
enough to initiate things to lead things, (I will) open an NGO to do some activities
of empowerment, of teaching colonialism ... (and) English as a foreign
language(lines, 581-583)." He believes Jews are more transformed by the
educational process or at least those that work as facilitators. As evidence he
mentions a few of his Jewish acquaintances who have changed their lives , for
example by becoming professionally involved in the sphere of peace education or
by becoming 'Refusniks' and refusing to serve in the army. He also shared with us
his experience of traveling to the United States in order to raise money for his
organization. Khalid relates that once, after making a plea for financial support to
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Diaspora Palestinians, he was asked rhetorically if he expected their already limited
funds to go to his NGO or to a children's medical clinic in the Jabalyah refugee
camp. Khalid's answer was clear, it followed from his perception that his Palestinian
brothers in the Palestinian Authority were the first priority, it was clear to him that
the medical clinic in Jabalyah more desperately needed the support then his
organization.
Other Jewish and Palestinian narratives (the other interviews)
As stated at the opening of this section, we believe these interviews to be
somewhat representative of the facilitators we interviewed. We want now to offer
some substantiation for this belief.
Each of the facilitators had very different experiences meeting with
individuals of the other group. However all but one of our Jewish interviewees
related similar stories emphasizing that their first meeting with Palestinians took
place rather late in life or in sporadic events when because of their parents'
profession they met Palestinians working for them. Palestinian interviewees had for
the most part experienced similar encounters to the ones related to by Khalid (or
heard about them from relatives) and this point is strengthened by Yaron
mentioning during his interview having heard similar stories from his Palestinians
colleagues at work.
None of the Palestinian facilitators reported on an early visit neither to any
foreign country, nor as stated above, had any of them immigrated to Israel. On the
other hand more than half of the Jewish facilitators indicated having a
'multicultural' experience in a foreign country when explaining their first interest in
the inter-group encounters.
Almost all of our Jewish interviewees mention going through a
transformative experience the moment they join the corps of intergroup facilitation.
This transformation seems to center around the raising of doubts regarding the
Zionist grand-narrative which they had become socialized to through schooling and
or youth groups in Israel or the Diaspora. A few of our Jewish interviewees make
mention in their interviews of the fact that they perceive differences between the
Jews and the Palestinians attending the programs (or more generally regarding their
communal-social organization). To the Jewish participants, Palestinians, for the
most part, are thought of as being more traditional and somewhat lacking skills. The
term 'mentality' is used to describe this difficult to define, but clearly sensed,
'cultural' difference. At times, Palestinian interviewees agree with these
characterizations.
Almost all (indifferent of their national/ethnic affiliation) our interviewees
pointed at the uni-national (ethnically segregated) activities as the ones considered
to be the most important in the educational process.
Moreover they all seem to consider the effects of the inter-group encounter
as one which deals with cognitive aspects related to better understandings of their
present situations, identity reconsiderations and at times modification, and the
learning of historical facts. Moreover, and in lines with our mentioning of the
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cogmt1v1st disposition of the interviewees, all facilitators seem to adhere to an
individualistic perspective in terms of educational processes. The goal of the
process is influencing the individual 'mind,' despite the declared aim of some of the
Palestinian facilitators that their goal is to strengthen group identities.
Still
Palestinian facilitators, when asked what might need· to be added to the present
educational process, tend to mention practical activities as if pointing in the
direction of some real political/social work/activity and not just more cognitive
exercising. All in all, Jewish interviewees seem for the most part happier with the
outcomes of the educational process for the Jewish participants than Palestinian
facilitators for Palestinian participants.

Discussion
Being a Palestinian in Israel is not easy. Characterizing the narratives
represented above as asymmetric might be a gross understatement. Khalid's story is
not one of asymmetry but one of dispossession. Palestinians in Israel suffer from
very deep structural constrains which impede their development in all ways of life
and prevent them even from easily holding to a respectful self appreciation. If at all,
outside of their immediate segregated context Palestinians still lack spheres of trust
and support in order to develop any confidence in a better future. Jews on their side,
as many other majorities, can be blind to any 'otherness.' This, in itself, could bring
into question the potential relevance of cognitive educational approaches to change
when the very basic structures are unsupportive of the change envisioned by good
willed facilitators.
Our Jewish facilitators are indeed critical and reflective, but even so, their
discourse is infiltrated by meanings they themselves realize are not appropriate. For
example, Yaron is well aware that 'mentality' is not a fitting description of
differences between the Jewish group and the Palestinian group, but common use,
the cultural resources within which his language evolves, the authorial dictates of
Zionist and psychologized perspectives serve him the words he regrets but is unable
to find an alternative for. Similarly Y aron mentions the 'Israeli way' as a non
inclusive category related to Jewish Israelis. These details are not unimportant as it
is in the banality (Billig, 1995) of every day practices where dispositions are found,
and not in the heads of individuals . Yaron tells us also about Palestinian facilitators
having in a sense an easier task. At the declarative level they do indeed, the setting
of the transformative intergroup encounter offers the opportunity to shake at least
discursively the grand Zionist narrative. Yaron is part of this setting and he supports
this ideological aim, but even when doing so he mentions that the Jewish facilitator
has the difficult task to defend the Jewish narrative perspective. In an educational
situation with adolescents this might sound like a good strategy, no one deserves to
be fully denied specially when considering that the educational system in its totality,
outside of the intergroup encounters, denies this emancipatory perspective. This
being agreed upon, still we need to confront the fact that even in the most
ideological emancipatory settings (the intergroup encounters) the hegemonic forces
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hold the floor. Yaron does fear to prejudice the well-being of young Jews
confronted with a strong critique of what till then was for them an undeniable
justifiable 'truth' (the right of the sate of Israel to exist as Jewish). Moreover we
need to consider that this fact seems to go unaccounted for by the most experienced
facilitators.
Similarly, but this time much more critically articulated, we need give
attention to Yaron's description of the use of Hebrew and Arabic in the seminars.
Yaron is one of the few Jewish facilitators who knows Arabic, but he does
acknowledge that in the seminar 'game' Arabic and its use, though having the
potential to make a point with the Jewish participants, risks also loosing the game
and the little that might be otherwise achieved by exhausting or upsetting the
potential beneficiaries of the educational activity, the Jews. The hegemonic context
is indeed powerful and overcomes even well intended declared emancipatory
activities. The fact that a critical Zionist as Yaron seems to be, does not pay
attention to this paradoxical situation might indicate his own imprisonment (still)
within hegemonic thinking.
Yaron, in the interview offers evidence of his own transformation from an
uncritical, politically-correct, traditional-liberal-left Israeli into a non-Zionist. There
is no reason to doubt the sincerity of this statement but there are places in the
interview which open up the opportunity to question the meaning of his position. He
still performs reserve army duties (though not in the conquered territories). Docs
this mean that his position reflects an understanding of the problems of the Zionist
ideology as one related only to the Palestinians outside of the internationally
recognized territories of the state of Israel? Or does he mean he sees no problem
participating in the (almost only Jewish) army because he expects at some point
Palestinians living in Israel to accept it as a civic duty? Not addressing these issues
should be considered problematic at least at the level of those involved in directing
the educational activity.
Yaron points, although not in a fully clear extent, to the Palestinian boys as
creating some problems during the seminar in their approach to (flirt with) the
Jewish girls. The use of the words "would be very compromising and like .... and
usually with uh Jewish girls" lead us to believe the issue in mind relates to
endogamy as a preferred mating option. Even if this is not fully clear in the context
of Yaron's statement we want to point through this example at the lack of clarity
that exists regarding the preferred outcomes of the educational process for it to be
successful in the eyes of our facilitators. In this case both Jewish and Palestinian
facilitators, rather than pointing at some cognitive expected change - the
Palestinians looking for the strengthening of the groups identity and the Jews in
search of a core critical approach which would pave the way for a more just society
- find it difficult to articulate exactly what they envision as a successful result of
their educational effort. Even if we say they do this, a solution based mostly on
equity (clearly not a bad starting option) which seems to work in lines with the
intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954), the theoretical perspective stresses
dysfunctional human relationships as causal factors of sectarianism in inter-group
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conflict rather than historical forces of malign political forces (Cochrane and Dunn
2002). As such this solution falls short in its articulation of how individual
behaviors are to be sustained in their every day activities.
At this point contact theories deal for the most part with prejudice reduction
and majority/minority group relations and not with overall future interactional
societal developments among individuals in groups in conflict. Given these
theoretical focus on inter-group relations we need consider that the encounters,
while acting as if persuaded by these paradigms, deal with living individuals who
in-their-way-somewhere consider not only group relations but also individual
relations. Similar issues have been raised in coexistence theorizing. Kriesberg
(1998) posits that coexistence is an open concept that "leaves a great deal of room
for various forms of relations," (p.183) and Bar-Tai (2004) recognizes the
vagueness and indistinctiveness of the concept and the fact that it pertains only to
minimal positive intergroup relations.
Khalid's story in contrast to Yaron's story needs not encounter alterity nor
be in search of it after some transformative experience (as is the case of Yaron after
his three week service at the check post). Khalid's becoming is conditioned by the
'others' denial and is shaped in dialogue with it. For Khalid joining the encounters
professionally is not only finding a spot in a vastly racist society to find solace,
respect, and recognition, or as in the Jewish case a place where to put some reality
to liberal ideology, but a place to find a better 'material' lot. He can be better off but
only in the place where at least declaratively he is involved in bettering JewishPalestinian relations, seemingly free but as shown above enveloped by the
hegemonic power. In no segregated Palestinian school could the process
accomplished by the encounters (easily) take place.
But Khalid is also a participant in the majorities ' perspective on his
community. For him too, Palestinians are submissive, tribal, and traditional, in short
non-westerns and as such somewhat 'primitive.' He is captive of western
epistemology as he also wants to emancipate the mind, but at the same time, he
questions the potential of the encounter seminars and considers going back to work
in his village.
In their narratives both men seem trapped in the cultural historical resources
that surround them. Their discourses are invaded and help sustain existing
ideological powers, understood as representations of aspects of the world, which
can be shown to contribute to the establishment, maintenance and change of social
relations of power domination and exploitation (Fairclough, 1995; Van Dijk, 1993).
Both state (Zionist) and psychologized western ideologies feed their imaginations
and constrain them in their interpretative options. Khalid, Yaron and our other
facilitators are animated and in tum animate (Goffman, 1974), in their generated
interviews, by socio-historical processes which bring about the nation state and its
accompanying technologies, a psychologized based education with its reified
assumptions regarding identity and culture, and thus may be constrained in their
educational efforts. Cognitive perspectives may be a good solution to majority
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"magically/religiously/psychologically' purifying their souls but are not very helpful
to minorities which readily realize that verbal laconic recognition without material
change will not take them too far in their struggle for equity. Khalid knows this too
well as he fears Palestinian youth in the encounters will become frustrated, and even
Yaron seems to recognize this. Thus, both seem to prefer a uninational approach
which will allow them at least to achieve something - a rather small portion of their
declared aims. Khalid will offer in these uninational sessions some identity building
hoping to scaffold the youth progress into an unsecured future and Yaron will get
his participants, at age of seventeen to the point he arrived only at the age of twenty
six. It is not for us here to decide if this justifies their hard work. However, their
actions, even if successful, do not seem to threaten any established order and as
such can be allowed to continue.
Last we want to mention one of the central issues we find in the accounts of
the facilitator - one which crosses educational boundaries - which has to do with,
what in educational spheres, is called a child-centered discourse or an individualistic
perspective. This discourse situates meaning, learning, and motivations within the
individual and considers identities to be categories of individual minds. The
perspective in line with western paradigmatic developments is a cognitivist one in
which learning follows development (Piaget, 1954). In educational theorizing these
perspectives have come under attack for it has been shown they privilege children
who are white and middle class thus projecting intellectual social emotional white
middle class standards on all participating children. Moreover the individualistic
perspective might infiltrate the educational activity overcoming the declared
emphasis on group identity held by the facilitators (Bekerman, in press) .
The discursive approach we adopted in the analysis allowed themes to
emerge and guided us in taking these categories and their descriptions not as reports
of interior states of mind but as social action which when properly investigated
afford access to a cultural universe and its content of moral assumptions (Potter &
Wetherell, 1987; Silverman, 1993). The way people describe things and their
reasoning about them are pragmatic selections (Sacks, 1992) from a range of
cultural, contextual possibilities with which they sustain an ongoing dialogue
(Bakhtin, 1981). Moreover mere describing is always a social and moral activity
(Jayussi, 1964). These experiences/descriptions/accounts can either be denied or
taken seriously. We strongly believe they need to be taken seriously. Successful
social transformation is not dependent on the sharpness of theorizing but on the
every day activity of those we mean to train and or transform. It is hoped that when
taking these experiences/descriptions/accounts seriously both planners and
researchers will be able to use them as constructs in the development of broader and
better training and educational designs of social transformation.
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WHAT WE DON'T KNOW CAN HELP US:
ELICITING OUT-OF-DISCIPLINE KNOWLEDGE FOR WORK WITH
INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS

Jennifer Goldman and Peter Coleman

Abstract

In this article, the authors present the results of a study in which a diverse
variety of experts in fields outside the traditional conflict domain were interviewed
about their ideas regarding intractable conflicts. The purpose of this study was to
gather.frame-breaking insights and practical approaches that could shed new light
on complex, persistent conflict that has been particularly resistant to resolution.
The authors argue that outsiders to the field are more likely to provide fresh
perspective and radical approaches to the conflict field's most intransigent
problems because they are not constrained by the field's pre-existing normative
frames.
This article examines some of their findings-from ideas on how
globalization has exacerbated intractable conflicts, to ways that Biblical metaphors
can be used to promote reconciliation, to an analysis of how philosophical concepts
such as morality and impartiality can be used to produce fair outcomes, to ideas on
the creation of an independent, international regional facilitation corps. In
addition to a summary of content findings, methodological recommendations for
future similar studies are offered.
Introduction

Intractable conflicts tend to be self-perpetuating and seem irresolvable,
which leads scholars and practitioners to face overwhelming challenges in seeking
to understand, manage, and heal them (Coleman 2003). While in recent years, our
understanding of intractable conflict has grown, it has been limited by the particular
frames through which we view it, including disciplinary, cultural, role-in-conflict
(for example, expert versus disputant), and class-based perspectives. We argue that
frame-breaking approaches are needed in order to unlock intractable conflicts, and
that outsiders to the conflict field have a unique ability to identify these new
approaches, since they are not constrained by the field's pre-existing normative
frames.
Thus, this article presents an exploratory study of extra-disciplinary
knowledge for work with intractable conflicts. First, we provide a brief overview of
our understanding of intractable conflict. Second, we offer an argument for the
important role that frame-breaking ideas can play in enhancing our ability to work
with intractable conflicts. Third, we outline our methods for an interview study
designed to bring forth some of these frame-breaking ideas. Fourth, we highlight
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our findings according to an analytic framework that emerged through our analysis
of the data. Finally, we offer an overview of methodological learnings and
recommendations for conducting this type of elicitive research in the future.
Definition and Characteristics of Intractable Conflict
Intractable conflicts are those that stubbornly persist despite continued
attempts at resolution. The dictionary definition of "intractable" is "not easily
governed, managed or directed; not easily manipulated or wrought; not easily
relieved or cured" (Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2005). This definition reflects our
view that intractable conflicts are particularly intransigent and difficult to manage,
transform and resolve, but that they are by no means hopeless. We use the term
intractable conflict to suggest (as many in the field have; see Burgess and Burgess
2005) that we must work passionately and rigorously to move these conflicts
beyond their current intractable states. (For a more in-depth discussion on the
definition and meaning of the term intractable conflict, see Kriesberg et. al. 1989;
Coleman 2000, 2003; Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2004, 2005; Putnam and
Wondolleck 2003; Burgess and Burgess 2005).
Intractable conflicts can be broadly defined by three overarching
characteristics. First, intractable conflicts are protracted; that is, they persist over a
long period of time. For example, they are characterized by long-standing conflict
that manifests itself in cyclical patterns, with frequent bursts of violence juxtaposed
with periods of relative quiet as conflict brews beneath the surface (Putnam and
Wondolleck 2003; Coleman 2000). Second, they are waged in ways that the
adversaries themselves or third parties perceive to be destructive, such as by bearing
devastating financial costs as well as extremely traumatic physical and emotional
consequences. Third, they continue despite repeated attempts by third parties to
resolve or transform them (Kreisberg 2005).
Another way to view intractable conflicts is by distinguishing them from
more tractable forms of conflict along five specific dimensions: context, issues,
relationships, processes and outcomes. For instance, intractable conflicts often take
place within a context of injustice and instability; focus on paradoxical dilemmas
and highly symbolic issues; involve destructive and polarized relationships between
and among individuals and groups; embody intense, emotional and complex
processes; and lead to devastating outcomes including protracted trauma that is
often perpetuated over generations (Coleman 2003).
Consequences and Costs oflntractable Conflict
The consequences of intractable conflicts are wide-ranging and, for the
most part, devastating. Possibly the most striking impact is the toll that intractable
conflicts take on human life itself. Since the end of the Cold War, protracted civil
and interstate conflicts around the world have claimed millions of lives (Brendt and
Scott 2004). For example, in the protracted conflict in Afghanistan which began in
1979, over 1,000 battle-related deaths occurred each year between 1989 and 2000.
Nearly as many deaths occurred in the on-going conflict in Sudan during the same
period (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001 ). During thirty years of on-going conflict
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in Cambodia, close to 16% of the country's civilian population died in the fighting
(Brendt and Scott 2004).
Of those who survive intractable conflict, a plethora of physical challenges
remain. For example, in the conflict in Sudan, which has been on-going since 1983,
more than four million people have been either internally displaced or have become
international refugees in the neighboring country of Chad (Brandt and Scott 2004).
Such displaced people are particularly vulnerable to disease, attack by combatants,
and natural disasters (Brahm 2005). Displaced children are particularly vulnerable
to death from malnutrition and disease caused by lack of adequate shelter, and the
absence of safe water or sanitation (UN News Centre 2005). In addition, survivors
of intractable conflict often sustain entrenched psychological wounds, and a deep
sense of grievance, humiliation and victimization (Crocker, Hampson and Aall
2004; Lindner 2002; Coleman 2003). For example, a 2001 Physicians for Human
Rights (2005) survey of 724 Afghani women found that over 70% of the women
living in Taliban-controlled areas met diagnostic criteria for major depression, over
65% of the women had considered committing suicide and over 9% had made
suicide attempts.
In addition to physical and psychological consequences, intractable
conflicts incur high economic and infrastructure costs (Brendt and Scott 2004;
Coleman 2003; Burgess and Burgess 2005). For example, in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, which has persisted for over fifty years, both sides have paid extremely
heavy economic costs. From the start of the most recent Palestinian intifada
(uprising) in 2000 until 2004, Israel's gross domestic product loss is estimated to
have been between $7 and $12 billion (McGreal 2005), and the number of people
living below the poverty line in the Palestinian territories tripled from 637,000
people in 2000 to almost 2 million people in 2003 (World Bank Report 2003).
Intractable conflicts are currently understudied. Despite the pervasive and
costly nature of intractable conflicts occurring worldwide, the subject of intractable
conflict continues to be vastly understudied in the academic domain. For instance, a
web search using the keywords "intractable conflict" on the academic search
engines Lexis Nexis (searching Law Reviews), PsychINFO (database of academic
publications in psychology), Social Sciences Index, and ProQuest, which each
contain listings of thousands of scholarly articles, returned 9, 25, 47, and 134
articles on the subject respectively. A similar search for "protracted conflict" on
each of the databases only returned 8, 15, 82, and 177 articles respectively. In
contrast, a search using the more general keywords "social conflict" returned 51,
590, 3,514, and 851 articles respectively. This discrepancy between the number of
articles written on social conflict and on intractable, protracted conflict is
representative of the growing but limited scope of attention that has up until
recently been paid to the area of intractable conflict in the social sciences.
The Limits of our Current Understanding of Intractable Conflict
In addition to the fact that intractable conflict is a relatively understudied
domain, our understanding and ability to work with intractable conflict is also
limited by the particular perspectives through which we approach it. Our individual
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perspectives can prevent us from seeing and dealing with the conflict in radically
different ways-ways that are necessary if we are to overcome the conflicts'
resistance to our efforts. Cognitive scientists' current understanding of the nature of
human thought processing helps explain why this is so.
Metaphors and frames determine understanding. The majority of human
thought is believed to operate at a level is that outside of normal conscious
awareness (Lakoff and Johnson 1999).
This suggests that our cognitive
unconscious, by helping to shape conscious thought, has the power to determine our
sense of the external world. It is believed that the cognitive unconscious manifests
itself primarily through metaphor. In other words, we use metaphors, or implicit
images, to help us understand unfamiliar, complex phenomena in the world around
us (Morgan 1997).
While metaphors shape our implicit understanding of phenomena, frames
are thought to extend those metaphors as they are deployed in the social world
(Creed, Langstraat and Scully 2002). Frame analysis, originated by Goffman
(1974) and extended by social movement theorists (e.g., Gamson and Lasch 1983;
Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986), refers to the way in which our use of
metaphors is mobilized into action in the real world, often in the service of
collective advocacy or public policy making (Creed, Langstraat and Scully 2002).
As such, frames play a significant role not only in determining our actions in the
social world-at-large, but also in the way we deal with intractable conflicts.
Metaphors and frames also limit understanding. Generally, metaphors and
frames may be useful in the sense that they enable us to understand otherwise overly
complex and abstract phenomena. However, by defining boundaries and directing
our attention to what seems relevant in a complex situation, metaphors and frames
determine our perspective and limit our view to only a part of the complex world
around us. This is similar to the way that picture frames define, and thus limit, what
part of a picture we see (Gamson and Lasch 1983; Gamson and Modigliani 1989;
Creed, Langstraat and Scully 2002). In addition, over time metaphors and frames
can become so ingrained that they cause us to disregard information that is
inconsistent with them, thus further narrowing the scope of our perspective (Lakoff
and Johnson 1999). Metaphors and frames particularly limit our vision in abstract
arenas such as social conflict where we depend heavily on them to make sense of
our surroundings.
The field currently uses frames to determine action strategies. Disputants,
third parties, scholars and practitioners all use frames to define the issues in a
conflict, and to determine what actions should (or should not) be taken to resolve
the conflict (Grey 2003). Coleman (2004) has identified five frames through which
scholars and practitioners currently approach intractable conflict: the realist, human
relations, medical, post-modernist and systems approaches. Brief definitions and
examples of strategies representing two of these frames are offered below in order
to demonstrate how frames affect not only our understanding, but also our
approaches to dealing with intractable conflicts.
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The realist frame has been the most influential in the study of war and peace
in history, politics, and international affairs. It views intractable conflicts as
dangerous, high-stakes games that are won through strategies of domination,
control, and counter-control. Strategies stemming from this frame include use of
deterrence and force, establishing institutional stability, and using social justice
activism. In contrast, the human relations frame emphasizes the role that human
social interactions play in generating, perpetuating, and resolving conflict. It views
intractable conflicts as built on destructive human relationships that become hostile
and extremely difficult to escape. Change is thought to be brought about through:
normative re-education processes emphasizing interdependence and inducing
cooperation, uncovering and expressing basic human needs, fostering reconciliation,
and cultivating tolerance and coexistence. As these examples illustrate, the frames
we use to understand the causes and nature of the conflict determine a unique set of
strategies used to manage, and ideally transform and resolve the conflict (Coleman
2004).
Yet the field still struggles with intractable conflicts. While the frames
outlined above have produced useful approaches for dealing with intractable
conflicts, they each contain limitations that can prevent them from effectively
breaking through the intractability (Coleman 2004; Grey 2003). The mere existence
of intractable conflicts that "stubbornly elude resolution, even when the best
available techniques are applied" (Burgess and Burgess 2005) is a testament to the
limitations inherent in these techniques and approaches. For example, conflict
between the Turks and Greeks on the island of Cyprus has been occurring for over
40 years. During that time, many of the world's powerful third parties, including
the U.S., NATO, and the United Nations have made numerous attempts at
peacekeeping and peacemaking in Cyprus. These have included interventions such
as: direct appeals to the leaders or heads of state, military intervention, mediation,
direct negotiations, summit talks, shuttle diplomacy, funding for peace and
reconstruction, numerous United Nations resolutions. Grassroots initiatives were
also deployed, such as interactive problem-solving workshops and inter-communal
dialogues. At times, these initiatives have been successful at containing or
managing the violence, but they have not yet made significant progress in achieving
a sustained resolution of the conflict. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan has
repeatedly stated, the continuing quiet on the island should not obscure the fact that
there is only a cease-fire in Cyprus, not peace (UN Website 2005). The Cyprus case
is only one example of protracted conflict that has stubbornly eluded resolution; as
described earlier, similar cases abound domestically on issues of abortion, race
relations, and sexual orientation (Burgess and Burgess 2005) and in civil and
interstate conflicts occurring in places including Angola, Congo, Israel-Palestine,
Lebanon, Sudan, and Tibet-China to name just a few (Brandt and Scott 2004).
Frame-breaking perspectives are needed to move beyond intractability. It is
possible that intractable conflicts arc so complicated that they're just unsolvable; it
could be that some conflicts will persist no matter how we look at or approach them.
However, another possibility is that certain conflicts seem unsolvable because of the
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way we look at them. Perhaps we get so entrenched in our own perspectives, that
we're unable to see new, radically different approaches that could unlock these
situations.
We argue that outsiders to the conflict field have a unique ability to identify
these new approaches. Outsiders are not constrained by the field's pre-existing
normative frames, and thus are more likely to bring fresh, new insight and
perspective to the problem. Kuhn (I 970) suggests that in order for radical change to
take place, paradigms must shift, and this happens when new people look at old
problems in radically different ways than their predecessors. Kuhn and others (see
Burke 2001; Gladwell 2002; and Gersick 1991) argue that radical change is not
evolutionary, but rather occurs in revolutionary ways that are driven by agents of
change. In his ground-breaking essay The Structure of Scient[fic Revolutions, Kuhn
(1970) asserts that revolutionary thinkers are usually not established experts in a
field of study, but rather are more likely to be "either very young or very new to the
field whose paradigm they change" (p. 90).
Empirical evidence also suggests that outsiders, as compared to insiders in a
field, are better able to make frame-breaking insights. For example, in a study on
organizational change, Tushman, Newman and Romanelli (1986) found that
"externally recruited executives are more than three times more likely to initiate
frame-breaking change than existing executive teams" (p. 42).
Ironically, it is often the perceived intractability of a situation that attracts
help from outsiders. Of crisis situations, Gcrsick (1991) writes,
"Unless such failures kill the system, they command increasing attention
and raise the likelihood that newcomers will either be attracted or recruited
to help solve the problems. The newcomer has the opportunity to see the
system in an entirely different context than incumbent members, and he or
she may begin problem solving on a new path" (p.23).
In this study, we actively recruited and hand-selected experts well-known
for their ground-breaking work in a diverse array of fields including architecture,
environmental ethics, history, philosophy, policy, and religion. We solicited their
ideas about intractable problems in their own work and how they would translate
those ideas into useful metaphors, approaches and practices for dealing with
intractable social conflict. We asked them to help us "problem solve on a new path"
to break through the intractability of conflict as we know it. This paper presents a
study that sought to elicit frame-breaking ideas in the field of intractable conflict.

Method
Design Overview
Through an expert nomination process, nine (9) participants were recruited
to be interviewed regarding their views on the sources, approaches to, and
metaphors regarding intractable conflict situations. Participants were recruited
through nominations by members of the University of Colorado at Boulder
Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base Project's (ICKBP's) community of
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approximately 75 scholar-practitioners. Participants were selected based on their
expertise in areas considered to be relevant but currently peripheral to the dominant
discourse in intractable conflict (i.e., religion, philosophy, architecture, etc.). An
eight-question semi-structured interview schedule was developed to explore the
participants' views on intractable conflict situations. Semi-structured interviewing
and content-coding analysis methods (sec Smith, Harre and Langenhove, 1995)
were used to elicit, code and interpret information from a series of digitallyrecorded and subsequently transcribed telephone interviews.
Participants
Participants represented diverse disciplinary expertise. They ranged in age
from approximately 30 to 80 years, included both male and female experts, and
were of varied national and ethnic backgrounds and socio-economic statuses. Each
participant was paid a $100 honorarium, signed an information consent form, and
was given the choice to participate under conditions of confidentiality or
acknowledgement for participation in the study. All participants, with the exception
of one, chose to be acknowledged.
In alphabetical order, the participants who chose to be acknowledged were:
Name

Title*

Dr. Rudolph
Avenhaus

Professor
of Statistics
and
Operations Research, Universitat
der Bundeswehr Miinchen
Usoni Method Coach for Groups
and Individuals
Professor of Environmental Ethics
and Philosophy, New York
University
Deputy Director of the Institute for
USA and Canada Studies, Russian
Academy of Sciences
Architect and Municipal and
Urban Projects Manager, Centro
de Estudios Urbanos y Regionales,
Pontificia
Universidad Catolica
Madre y Maestra
Associate Professor of Philosophy,
Department of Philosophy and
Religious Studies, and Affiliate
Professor of Conflict Analysis,
George Mason University

J. Atieno Fisher
Dr. Dale Jamieson

Dr. Victor
Kremenyuk
Rosa A. Maria

Dr. Daniel Rothbart

Area of Expertise
Game theory

Psychodrama
Environmental
ethics
RussianAmerican history
and policy
Architecture and
community
organizing

Philosophy and
religion
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Geographic
Location
Germany

Washington,
D.C.
New York

Moscow

Dominican
Republic

Fairfax,
Virginia

Richard Rubenstein,
J.D.
Rabbi Zalman
Schachter-Shalomi
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Richard Rubenstein,
J.D.

Professor of Conflict Resolution
and Public Affairs, George Mason
University

Law

Rabbi Zalman
Schachter-Shalomi

Fairfax,
Virginia

Spiritual Leader, Jewish Renewal
Jewish theology
Boulder,
Movement;
and ritual
Colorado
Professor
Emeritus,
Temple
University; Professor of Religious
Studies, Naropa University
(* Although some of the participants identify as conflict resolution scholars
or practitioners, they were selected for participation in this study because their
unique backgrounds suggested that they had new or different perspectives on the
subject that were particularly worthy of being described in this research.)
Procedure
Prior to conducting each interview, participants were emailed a PreInterview Memo asking them to review two summary articles on intractable
conflict, meant to serve as a link between the participants' disciplinary domain and
that of the researchers. The purpose of the semi-structured interview protocol was
to elicit new "frame-breaking" insights that would enhance understanding about,
and ways to address, intractable conflicts. In order to do this, we designed the
interview schedule to explore: participants' implicitly held metaphorical lenses for
understanding intractable conflict; new ideas about ways to effectively approach
intractable conflicts; activities participants recommended to address intractable
conflicts; and implicit or explicit frameworks that informed the approaches and
action ideas participants articulated.
Thus, it was designed to encourage
participants to share their perspectives on intractable conflict and to enable us to
follow the participants' line of thinking.
Upon the conclusion of each interview, participants were emailed a PostInterview Memo asking them to provide an annotated list of references, including
books, articles, websites, videotapes and other materials that would be relevant to
the conversation that occurred in the interview. All participants were responsive to
this request. Throughout the interview process, we kept a journal describing
insights, themes emerging across interviews, and methodological challenges to
eliciting out-of-discipline knowledge.
Results
The information elicited in the interviews was expansive. However, for the
sake of brevity, we have summarized several of the more original insights in two
broad areas: metaphors and perspectives (metaphors and other lenses through which
participants view intractable conflicts) and approaches and practices (general
approaches and specific practices participants recommend to address intractable
conflicts). (See Figure 1).
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Metaphors and Perspectives

•
•
•

•

Approaches and Practices

•

The Empire Metaphor
The Globalization Paradox
The Abraham Metaphor
The Spirits Metaphor

•

•
•

Create an Independent,
International Regional
Facilitation Corps
Distinguish Between Morality
and Moralism
Use Narratological Analysis and
Psychodrama
Work with "Cold Cases"

Figure 1. Analytic Framework: Perspectives and Approaches.
Perspectives
Individuals understand the world around them primarily through the use of
metaphors, which enables them to make sense of complex and abstract phenomena
(Morgan 1997; Creed, Langstraat and Scully 2002). Since metaphors affect, and in
some ways dictate the way we view the world, in order to illuminate the ways in
which the participants understand the phenomenon of intractable conflict, we
provide an overview of the metaphorical lenses and perspectives through which
they view the problem of intractable conflict.
The Empire Metaphor. While third party intervention in intractable
international conflicts is often necessary, certain types of interventions do more
harm than good. A primary example of this is what Richard Rubenstein calls the
"relationship of empire to conflict." He describes empires as entities that seek to
maintain broad territorial control while also resolving conflict among client states.
Rubenstein suggests that because the empire's efforts at conflict resolution are often
confounded by its own interests in the conflict region, the empire tends to contribute
to the intractability of conflict, rather than resolve it. For example, he notes that the
U.S., like the traditional empire, has become caught between competing agendas: on
the one hand, it puts forth an idealistic goal of helping other countries to resolve
conflict, and on the other hand, it acts on behalf of its own interests. He says,

This is part of the American exceptionalist thesis: that we were not going to
imitate these other old empires. Our relationship to the world was going to
be something different, and it was going to be less coercive. It was going to
be more idealistic. And so, you know, we would force the French out of
Southeast Asia, and.force the Dutch out of Indonesia, and.force the French
out of Algeria, and force the British out of Africa, or at least if not force,
you know, cheer them as they left. And it's only recently, really only since
Vietnam, which was the first great shock, when we tried to replace the
French in Vietnam, it's only at that point that this whole problem gets
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raised. And it's a problem with the relationship of empire to coriflict ... [For
example,} why did the United States commit itse(f to the support of the
vicious dictatorship in Iran if had nothing to do with interests that are in a
broader sense economic, that have to do with the interests of the U.S. and
other Western economic elite and the interests ofpolitical elite?
In addition to the example Rubenstein offers about the U.S. 's relationship
with Iran, the current situation in Iraq offers another illustrative example of the
ways in which the U.S. as empire exacerbates conflict. While some may view the
U.S. 's intervention as the right thing to do in response to a perceived threat, the
U.S.' s real or perceived economic and political interests in the region prevent it
from being perceived by many Iraqis and others as a liberator working on behalf of
the Iraqis ' best interests. Rubenstein suggests that there is some complacency in the
world at large which leads us to accept as the status quo the empire intervening with
its self-interest at the top of its agenda. He notes,
In a sense, everybody understands that [self interest] was a factor [in the
U.S. relationship with Iran] and so they understand it and then they forget
it. Maybe they forget it because they think basically there's nothing they
can do about it ... There's a tendency among people in our business, in every
other academic discipline and business to say well, that's a fact. You can't
really change it, so you just live with it. And the second stage is not only do
you live with it, you don't think very much about it. But, you know, to my
mind there are identity group conflicts that can be talked about that don't
have much to do with the kind of global drive for economic supremacy by
large corporations and states aligned with and representing large
corporations. But, so much of the conflict in the world that's most
contentious and most intractable is intractable because, it seems to me,
because it has structural sources. And [the empire's coriflation of coriflict
resolution with self interest is] one of them.
Rubenstein further suggests that the "empire as conflict resolver" syndrome
may indeed implicate the field of conflict resolution itself as Westerners become
viewed as having their own interests at the top of the agenda, no matter what their
official role. The recent violent kidnappings, killings and beheadings of UN
officials, journalists and aid workers in Iraq speaks to the unwillingness of some
Iraqis to distinguish between the occupying forces and those who might consider
themselves to be more neutral. Rubenstein says,
There's a question for our field now as to whether, in an era of U.S.
attempts to become or maintain economic or political hegemony on a
global scale, there's a question as to whether the coriflict resolution field is
going to become basically an adjunct to that effort. That in the new Roman
Empire .. . we're the soft imperialists. You know, we're the ones who resolve
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confUcts among the satellite states and go over and help resolve conflicts
[between] the various groups in Iraq so that the Americans can stabilize
their control. Or whether we're going to be looking at global conflict as
coming from systemic sources which implicate the United States.

To deal with the problems that are generated by the relationship of the
empire to conflict, Rubenstein proposes ideas that can help conflict scholars,
practitioners, governmental officials, security advisors and others to think more
critically about the nature of the current "empire"-based intervention approach and
to begin to seek alternative conflict resolution mechanisms in the international
arena. In the Approaches section of this paper, we highlight an alternative idea
Rubenstein discusses regarding the creation of an independent, international
regional facilitation corps to more effectively manage international intractable
conflicts.
The Globalization Paradox. There are at least two different stories one can
tell about globalization. The first, more popular story focuses on the benefits of a
globalized world. This story elicits images of a global village, in which
communication, travel and commerce are made easier, and many people benefit: the
global citizen becomes exposed to different cultures, the businessperson expands
markets, and global companies coordinate more efficiently and successfully.
However, a second less rosy picture is that globalization has set off the
current increase in conflict around the world. Why would this be the case? First,
like any new phenomenon that has far-reaching political and social implications,
globalization has the power to bring about substantial change and instability in a
region. Significant change in a system can weaken normative influences on social
behavior, encouraging people to question the status quo and voice previously
unspoken needs and concerns. This type of questioning can decrease the public's
level of trust in conflict resolution procedures, laws and institutions, and weaken
their ability to deal with problems, thus destabilizing the situation further. Under
these conditions, intractable conflicts are more likely to occur (Coleman, 2003).
For example, we can see this in the current situation in Iraq, where political, social
and economic instability has led to an increase in violent, deadly conflict.
Second, prior to globalization, groups who differed ethnically, racially and
religiously may have been sheltered from one another by geographical distances.
However, globalization has led to a relative ease of communication across such
distances, bringing about the proximity of formerly isolated groups. This new
proximity can force groups to confront their differences and inflame identity and
worldview clashes. Such differences of ethnic, racial or religious identity can fuel
long-term conflict. However, even if the issues themselves are not necessarily
inherently irresolvable, geographical constraints often make it difficult, if not
impossible, for the parties to extricate themselves from the situation. This inability
of the parties to be removed from the situation contributes to its intractability
(Coleman 2003). On the topic of formerly isolated groups, Rubenstein says,
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... If there's a fundamental cause of intractable, long-term conflict it's the
coming together, the being brought together of disparate groups, groups
that are disparate in every way, culturally, power and so forth, the bringing
together of formerly isolated groups .. .It injlames identity problems; it
makes worldview problems which weren't even visible, all of the sudden
visible; it increases competition for resources, etc. It also produces the
basis for a possible, you know, community of man, humanity. So that the
same time you get this kind of glowing promise of global solidarity, of
global familiarity and so forth, right next door is this greatly inflamed
conflict caused by the fact that people, really over a long course of human
history ... According to a lot of the anthropologists, we seem to have started
out as a relatively small population on earth ... homosapians, scattered all
over the place. Very diverse and everybody doing whatever they wanted to
do in terms of their own communities and not having much contact with
other communities. And then around the time that written history begins,
that changes. Now it's just hurtling ahead towards what I call the real
globalism, of which AIDS and all of that is the most dramatic and visible
and scary symptom.
Rubenstein and Dr. Victor Kremenyuk suggest that the new proximity of
formerly isolated groups can raise groups' sense of relative deprivation. A state of
relative deprivation is said to exist when a gap exists between what people feel they
deserve and what they feel they can achieve in comparison to a relevant reference
group (Gurr 1970). Kremenyuk proposes that, whether the resources are actually
limited or not, once the sense of relative deprivation arises in a population,
especially if individuals are socialized to believe that material resources are limited
and that in order for one group to gain in wealth another must lose, intractable
conflicts arise. Kremenyuk states,

You know, it maybe was much easier to live, say, a hundred years ago when
millions ofpeople somewhere in Egypt or in some other ... They never knew
anything about America, about the high standards of living in the more
developed nations.
They lived a traditional life.
But due to the
globalization, this isolation was broken. And now millions of people in
India or Bangladesh or in any other, you know, poor country, they know
that there are nations which live much better. Or millions ofpeople here in
Russia, they also know, they have seen movies, they have seen other TV
programs. So the problem is now what to do with their desire to live better.
Then it'd be framed as a constructive force which will make the people
hecome more active for r~forms, for changing their lives, or it may be used
to frame a hostility towards the richer country. To say that you are poor
because they are rich ... If you want to become richer, they should be
robbed. So this is the only possibility for you to become rich. Then, of
course, that will be framed as an ideological confhct. In that case, the
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communisitic ideology will come back and the millions of people will
believe again that to make their lives better, they should attack and destroy
the bastions of capitalism or, if to speak about the Islamic war, the millions
of those people, they want to make their lives better, they have to attack or
fight against the infidel and to take part o_f their wealth and to share it.
The Abraham Metaphor. Issues in intractable conflict situations tend to be
highly symbolic, and they often take on their symbolism through their connection to
pervasive conflict narratives, or stories, that define what is good, moral and right in
a conflict situation (Bar-Tal 2000). For example, the Biblical conflict between
Abraham's two sons, Ishmael and Isaac, has historically been drawn upon by Jews
and Muslims to justify their continuing conflict (Gopin 2002). However, Dr. Daniel
Rothbart argues that a reinterpretation of that story, with a focus on both peoples'
shared lineage from Abraham, can help promote reconciliation rather than
continued violence.
In the Biblical story, Sarah, Abraham's wife, has trouble bearing children,
so she offers Hagar, her maid-servant, to Abraham, and Hagar gives birth to a son,
Ishmael. Jealous of Hagar and determined to give Abraham a child of her own, at
an old age, Sarah is finally able to conceive, and gives birth to a son, Isaac. When
the two are young boys, Ishmael taunts Isaac, and Sarah's jealousy of Hagar and
Ishmael builds. Sarah admonishes Abraham to send Hagar and Ishmael away from
the family home, and Abraham follows her advice, banishing Hagar and Ishmael to
the desert.
Sarah saw the son whom Hagar the Egyptian had borne to Abraham
playing. She said to Abraham, "Cast out that slave-woman and her son, for
the son of that slave shall not share in the inheritance with my son Isaac."
The matter distressed Abraham greatly, for it concerned a son of his. But
God said to Abraham, "Do not be distressed over the boy or your slave;
whatever Sarah tells you, do as she says, for it is through Isaac that
offspring shall be continued for you. As for the son of the slave-woman, I
will make a nation of him, too, for he is your seed" (Genesis 21:9,
translated by The Jewish Publication Society 1999, 114).
The favored status of Isaac over Ishmael, and the two sons' conflictual
relationship lasts for many years. However, when their father Abraham dies, his
sons join together to bury him.
And Abraham breathed his last, dying at a good ripe age, old and
contented; and he was gathered to his kin. His sons Isaac and Ishmael
buried him in the Cave of Machpelah, in the field of Ephron ... After the
death of Abraham, God blessed his son Isaac. And Isaac settled near
Be'er-Lahai-Roi (Genesis 25:8, translated by The Jewish Publication
Society 1999, 140).
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A commentary on the Biblical passage above states,

Isaac and Ishmael are reunited at their.father's funeral, a sign that Ishmael
changed his ways as he matured. Although he could not have forgotten how
his father treated him and how his brother supplanted him, he seems to
have forgiven Abraham for having been a less-than-pe,:fect father. Isaac
too seems to have come to terms with his father's nearly killing him on
Mount Moriah ... Can we see this as a model for family reconciliations,
forgiving old hurts? And can it not be a model for the descendants of
Ishmael and Isaac, contemporary Arabs and Israeli Jews, to find grounds
for forgiveness and reconciliation? (The Jewish Publication Society 1999,
140).

The first part of the story, which focuses on the conflictual relationship
between Isaac and Ishmael has been used by their descendants, throughout history
and in modern times, to justify continued jealousy, hatred, and violence. However,
when the second part of the story regarding the brothers' reunion at their father's
burial is brought into focus, the story has the potential to promote mutual
recognition and reconciliation between the two peoples. In his book Holy War,
Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East (2002), Dr. Marc
Gopin describes how he uses the Abraham metaphor to bring together religious
leaders in the Jewish-Muslim conflict for dialogue and peace building initiatives in
the social, religious and political arenas. Of Gopin's work, Rothbart says,

[Marc Gopin 's} argument is that there are certain moral categories and
values that are established in this narrative in the Biblical story which can
be exploited, as it were, for transforming the way in which the participants
relate to each other. Instead of hatred it would be harmonious interaction.
To overcome the hatred by looking for, as it were, the values that are
portrayed in these stories. Both Arabs and Jews are seeking to secure a
home, to avoid conflict, to recognize the sacred land ... They need
security ... They need dignity, honor, compassion, and he's saying that
certain elements in the story suggests a kind of recognition of the other.
The example that Gopin has set by using the Abraham metaphor as a model
of reconciliation can and should be replicated in other conflict contexts. For
example, in the increasingly polarized communications between political right and
left wing groups in the U.S., the metaphor of democracy could be used to help
parties on both sides accept their differences as a natural part of a democratic, free
society, rather than to view the other side as bad or wrong.
The Spirits Metaphor. When practitioners work with groups involved in
conflict, issues around blame and responsibility inevitably arise.
Who is
responsible for getting us into this mess? To whom can we attribute the blame?
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While determining responsibility is often a necessary part of resolving conflict,
assigning blame can lead to defensive behavior, which tends to contribute to the
intractable nature of a conflict rather than resolve it.
J. Atieno Fisher suggests a useful method for helping individuals
acknowledge a problematic dynamic that is present in their interactions, without
threatening their sense of identity, or raising the level of emotionality and
defensiveness that is already present in most intractable conflict settings. Fisher
proposes using the metaphor of "spirits" to name a dynamic in an intractable
conflict system. The spirits metaphor can focus individuals' attention on the
dynamic without assigning blame to any one person or group. For example, Fisher
notes,
... When you're in a group and you recognize that there is a spirit here of
fear, or of scarcity, or-one thing that is really great about it is that it
depersonalizes it. So instead of, you know, this very narrow psychological
focus on: people need to be less selfish, they need to get over their fears,
and it's all about people .. .! don't need to tell you it's very threatening when
it's like, "Oh, my identity is under attack?" ... Where there's this spirit, and
it~'> inhabiting a group process, it's much less threatening, it's much moreyou know, a group can unite around: "Ok, let's not embody that spirit.
Let's send that spirit. Let's embody this spirit that we want as opposed to
[another one]. "
The spirits metaphor can be effective not only because it helps
depersonalize the issues, but because it can particularly resonate when working with
people whose religious or cultural backgrounds embrace the idea of spirits. For
example, Fisher says,
And I think also culturally, in a lot of cultures it really makes sense. People
know exactly what you're talking about when you mention spirits. And it's
just a great metaphor to be able to talk about it. Like, "Bring the spirit of
[blank]."
I remember doing psychodrama with this Native American
woman and she was talking about the god'>, and when I had her concretize
them, they were her ancestors. That conversation that she was having with
them was really the context for her whole story.
Fisher describes how, once the facilitator has named the "spirit," a group
can unite around sending the spirit away, and can choose to embody a new spirit in
place of the old one. She notes that a facilitator working with an organizational
conflict could say,
"There's a spirit and it's evident in the upper levels of this institution. It's
evident in how we're interacting in the business spirit of this institution, and
it's in the larger spirit of this [place] ... There's a pattern here; we can
embody it, or we can embody a different one. "
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Using the spirits metaphor can be a powerful way for facilitators to raise
parties' awareness about conflict-perpetuating dynamics without causing people to
feel defensive. Once this awareness is raised, a renewed metaphor can help the
parties break the cycle of the negative dynamic and shift into a new pattern of
interaction, which can otherwise be very difficult to do in intractable conflicts.
Approaches and Practices
The ideas highlighted below describe general approaches and specific
practices that conflict resolution scholars and practitioners can use to deal more
effectively with intractable conflict situations.
Create an Independent, International Regional Facilitation Corps. To address the
problems inherent in the "empire as conflict resolver" syndrome (see the
Perspectives section of this paper), Rubenstein proposes the creation of an
independent, international regional facilitation corps . The facilitation corps would
be implemented on a global scale. It would be comprised of regionally-based,
independent facilitators who would not represent the interests of any particular
nation. Their primary job would be to enable the parties involved in international
disputes to work together to develop their own approaches and solutions to their
conflicts. The facilitation corps would be built on the foundations of conflict
resolution scholarship and practice and would employ individuals with
demonstrated expertise in those areas.
By drawing on the skills and strengths of professionally-trained conflict
management experts, the facilitation corps would serve parties involved in
intractable conflicts using well-established as well as new, cutting-edge conflict
resolution techniques. The expert facilitators would enable the parties to develop
their own solutions, thus avoiding the "top-down" approach that at times further
entrenches nations in conflict. By employing neutral facilitators who do not
represent any nation's interests, the facilitation corps would help ensure that
international intractable conflicts were approached more fairly, taking into account
the needs and interests of the parties first and foremost (rather than those of an
intervening country). By employing regionally-based facilitators, those working
with the conflict would be more likely to be knowledgeable about the contextspecific conflict issues and to have excellent access to resources (such as people,
documents, and institutions) that are often necessary to learn about and effectively
address the needs, concerns, and interests of the involved parties.
Rubenstein describes the idea of the Corps:
For example, the model of the OSCE, Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, which is a voluntary organization set up by the
European states to do things together and to resolve conflicts. That's been
tremendously effective in some ways. And [Dr. Marc] Gopin is asking, and
I think he's exactly right, "Why shouldn't the Middle East have the
equivalent of an OSCE that would help the Iraqis now, for example, deal
with questions like, do they want their oil nationalized or privatized? Do
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they want to have an Islamic state or non-Islamic state or some kind of
combination? ... I mean, these are questions which the Americans are now
presuming to answer for everybody. And saying that there's some UN.
committee that should answer them isn't much better.
The parties
themselves need to answer those questions. And the parties most directly
qffected are the Iraqis themselves and their neighbors. So Gopin has been
screaming now for two or three years that this kind of regional conflict
resolution, using independent experts like us, who would be truly
independent. That is to say wouldn't be representing our government or
anybody else, we could be facilitators. So we can't make the decisions for
the folks; we can be facilitators. And that this should be done not only in
the Middle East. It should be done in the Balkans, and it should be done in
South Asia, all the places where the Transcend organization people have
been active and some of us have visited and so on. So that I'm not talking
now so much about a system .. .1 mean, I can.fantasize about a better system.
But I'm talking now more about process and I'm talking about a negative.
And the negative is: the American empire doesn't decide these issues. Also,
the American empire allied with the old European empire doesn't decide
these issues. The people in the areas most directly affected with whatever
facilitation they need and want decide these issues .. .I think it should be the
job of our field to help to help develop those alternatives.
Distinguish Morality from Moralism. Morality can be defined as a code of
conduct put forward by a society, religion, or other group that, under certain
conditions, would be supported by all rational people (Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 2004). In contrast, Dr. Dale Jamieson uses the term "moralism" to
describe a phenomenon in which individuals and groups inappropriately use moral
codes to support their own point of view. This type of behavior occurs frequently in
the context of intractable conflicts, and in fact, is often exactly what makes some
conflicts so difficult to resolve. Jamieson offers an example of Israelis' and
Palestinians' attempts to use moral values to justify their own rightness in the
conflict:

... When a Jewish settler says this land is only big enough for one of
us and it's going to be us, or a Palestinian says this land is only big
enough for one of us and it's going to be us-- that is exactly the
opposite of moral thinking. Whatever people might say about "we
were here first, " or "the Bible gave the land to us" and so on and
so forth, there's no real moral thinking that's going on in this case
because there is a complete failure of impartiality ... That's what
makes [morality] dffferent from moralism. Mora/ism can be
dressing up my own interests or preferences in the language of
objective right or truth. And there certainly is a lot of moralism in
these conflicts, but that's not the same [as morality].
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Jamieson suggests that one way to address intractable conflicts steeped in
moralistic arguments is to help the parties distinguish between morality and
moralism. He proposes that the concept of impartiality is at the essence of morality.
According to Jamieson, impartiality can be defined as working to bring about the
best overall results in a situation, regardless of the distribution of those results. For
example, if one is asked to make a decision by choosing from among a set of
policies without knowing which one might benefit or harm oneself, the choice is
said to be made impartially. In this sense, impartiality signifies a concern for the
whole system rather than concern only for one's own piece of it. A simple example
of impartiality in a conflict situation is the "cut and choose" system, in which two
siblings fighting over a piece of pie might decide that one sibling will cut the piece
of pie in half, and the other sibling will have the opportunity to choose which piece
to take first. This system encourages the person who cuts the pie to be as fair as
possible, since she doesn't know which piece of the pie she'll receive.
Jamieson suggests that morality, and by extension, impartiality can be used
in intractable conflict situations to help individuals and groups shift from a
moralistic point of view to a moral one. He says,
... Morality, essentially, is an institution or a set of social practices that is
pretty culturally universal, and evolved, I think, as a way of regulating
social behavior. In that sense it would be kind of weird to think that
morality was part of the problem in generating intractable conflicts, since
morality, just as an evolutionary artifact, is one of the ways that we cope
with having to live together in society. [The concept of morality] has
resources, once people really do engage in moral thinking, for making
progress on some of these conflicts.

The concepts of morality and impartiality can be used at many levels of
intervention, from interpersonal conflicts to international conflicts. On the
interpersonal level, let us take the case of a husband and wife who are in the process
of filing for divorce and are engaged in a bitter conflict over the custody rights for
their child. The wife argues that the child belongs primarily with his mother, and
she justifies her position by contending that all children need a mother's nurturance
and guidance. The husband supports his own logic by arguing that the most
important thing his son needs is a male role model and father-figure. Each parent
uses moral values to justify his or her own position. This is what Jamieson would
call engaging in moralistic thinking.
To help the couple reach an agreement on this issue, a mediator could
introduce the concept of impartiality. For example, the mediator could ask, "If you
did not know how the results of the custody decision would affect you, what would
you recommend as a fair outcome for all parties involved?" Or, "If we were talking
about someone else's child, and the decision were not going to affect either of you
at all, what do you think would be best for the child?" In this scenario, the mediator
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introduces the concept of impartiality to help the parties shift from a moralistic
point of view, in which each uses moral values to justify his or her own position, to
a moral point of view, in which the parties seek an outcome that can be considered
fair from all sides' perspectives.
Use Narratological Analysis and Psychodrama to Address Embedded
Conflict Narratives. Information provided by the media in the form of print,
television, and web-based journalism, by political leaders in the form of public
speeches, written documents and campaign advertisements, and through educational
sources such as curricula and textbooks all shape how the public perceives certain
issues, including large-scale conflict situations. In particular, according to Rothbart,
the metaphorical perspectives communicated through such information have the
power to define the conflict, and to determine a moral order in a society, in which
the writer's/leader's/speaker's own group is referred to as moral, fair and just, and
another group is depicted as evil, bad and wrong. When these stories become
embedded in the societal structure in which the conflict takes place, the situation
can become entrenched and intractable. For example, as the war in Iraq was
approaching in 2003, Rothbart noted,

Well, there's been a lot of analysis about the metaphors with George Bush
talking about the enemy in the Iraq war. These metaphors are very
powerful about his conception of not only what should be done against
Sadaam Hussein but also his sense of identifying what America is and what
the American identity is in relationship to the evils of Iraq. He uses these
terms oftentimes: the civilized world as opposed to uncivilized, a sense of
crusader, the crusade against forces of evil, darkness, lightness and so on.
It's a clear example of something that goes on a lot with respect to
protracted social coriflict. So many of them involve an identity through
religious myths and identity of the group that's given through these
religious story lines. There's no shortage of examples. And, again, what's
important here is that for Bush and for those people committed to these
religious narratives, it is what gives coherence to their own identity in
relation to the other, to the enemy or the forces of evil. And it's a whole
worldview. And what's fascinating about some of these speeches and some
of the narratological analysis of conversation and speeches is that these
words kind of sneak in and they seem rather innocent and, in some cases,
rather innocuous. But really they project a moral order ... an entire
worldview in some cases.
According to Rothbart, one practice for preventing the intractability of
conflict situations is to use a process called narratological analysis to raise the
public's level of awareness about the presence of metaphors in political speeches,
media reports, educational textbooks, etc. and the power they have to influence our
views about the conflict and the parties involved. Narratological analysis is
designed to examine the ways that "narrative structures our perception of both
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cultural artifacts and the world around us" (Introductory Guide to Critical Theory
website 2004 ). Rothbart discusses how narratological analysis can be applied to
work with intractable conflicts:

Methods ... that have been developed in great detail for understanding
small-scale conflicts, you know, in therapeutic contexts and in conflicts
among individuals, family dynamics and those settings, those methods can
be extended, I think, for understanding protracted social conflicts at a
broader scale. And in particular what's valuable about the narrative is that
the narrative basically provides or forces a question about the fundamental
metaphors that are used by the group for their own identity ... The challenge
in a narratological analysis is to look at the way in which words are used;
how the words assume certain moral standing within a group and between
one group and another group, and how those categories of identity
basically project a whole order, whose set of moral prescriptions about how
we should live our lives, obligations and rights and all of that.
Formal and informal educational programs could incorporate narratological
analysis methods to teach children and adults to think more critically about the
messages they receive from the media and educational sources. For example, high
school social studies curricula could teach students how to identify the ways in
which the writer/speaker/leader uses language to put forth his or her own views on
an issue and to prescribe how he or she would like us to respond to the issue. This
kind of educational initiative could raise awareness about the ways in which media,
political and educational sources affect the public's behavior in conflict situations.
Raising people's awareness about these issues could help prevent the issues from
becoming polarized, and in doing so, could prevent conflicts from becoming
intractable.
Another practice, called psychodrama, founded by Dr. Jacob. L. Moreno, is
a method of psychotherapy in which individuals enact events in their lives through
dramatization, role playing and dramatic self-presentation. Both verbal and nonverbal communications are utilized, and many psychotherapeutic techniques are
employed, such as role reversal, doubling, and soliloquy (Kellermann 1992).
Psychodrama can be used by facilitators in small group settings to deal with
intractable conflict situations. Use of psychodrama in such situations transforms
narrative on two levels: from the public to the personal, and from the "heard" to the
"seen". The narrative that has been communicated publicly through the media, and
other formal and informal education systems can be transformed by a personal
acting out of the story.
Using psychodrama techniques, a facilitator helps each group member tell
the stories that he or she brings to the group. Group members take turns being the
protagonist and serve as observers and actors for one another's stories. Once the
protagonist briefly describes his or her story, the story is then acted out using a
variety of psychotherapeutic techniques (such as role reversal, doubling, and
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soliloquy) to help the protagonist and other group members see the story from the
protagonist's perspective, and/or in a reinvented, alternative way. For example,
protagonists can change the story so that it reflects how they would ideally like to
have handled a situation by using verbal and non-verbal language that is unfamiliar
to them, and by trying out new roles and ways of interacting. Or, they can watch
themselves being played by another group member on stage, thereby maintaining
some physical distance from the story and viewing the interpersonal dynamics
present in the story from a new perspective. Through these and other techniques,
protagonists have the opportunity to, in a sense, re-live their personal story. In
addition to helping the protagonist, psychodrama also enables group members to
gain a better understanding of the protagonist's perspective, and thus to develop a
heightened sense of empathy for her or him.
Fisher describes a time when she used psychodrama to help a group of
Israeli and Palestinian high school students deal with the larger conflict as it was
reflected in their interpersonal relationships. She describes a scenario in which
Rina, a female Israeli student, is not happy with the behavior of Forsan, a male
Palestinian student (names of people and places in this story have been changed).
Rina does not like that Forsan laughs and makes fun during serious, troubling
moments regarding the conflict in their group. Following is a description of
Fisher's intervention in this small group situation:
I asked Forsan, "Do you ever remember a time where something was
serious but you were laughing?" He said, "No, not really." And then ... he
came back fairly quickly and said, ''Actually no, you know what, I do
remember a time." And so we set out that time ... He was with his family in
Nab/us, I believe, and ... there was bombing going on right by his house, and
he had been very .frightened, and his family was very frightened. His little
sister was screaming, his father was trying to be brave, his mother was
huddled in a corner. And he was acting like - hey, I wanna see the
helicopters. He was trying to blow it off like this is no big deal. And so we
saw that. We had people playing members of his family, people from the
group. And then I asked to sculpt how he would want it, because he had
picked two people to play him. There was a sort of care-free, inauthentic
Forsan, and the Forsan inside who was actually quite frightened and
concerned about his mother and little sister. I had him do most of it from
outside rather than being in the scene again, because it was pretty
traumatic. So he was watching this. And I had him sort of resculpt how he
would have wanted the moment to be, and what he did was, he put his
family together instead of being in different parts of the room ... He had them
all touching. He had them lined up kind of like in a family portrait where
they were all together. And Rina, who had initially had the complaint ... it
helped. It put a completely different context around [Forsan 's} behavior.
And then, you know, their conflict was completely transformed into another
level. [Rina} no longer had that complaint about [Forsan}.
She
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understood where it was coming from, and she was very gratified about his
story.
As the above anecdote suggests, observing personal stories using
psychodrama techniques makes it difficult to deny an individual's personal
experience. In the context of an intractable conflict, psychodrama can help
individuals find ways to reconcile the conflict stories they have learned through the
media and other public sources with personal stories of the Other. Ultimately, a
main goal of using psychodrama in conflict situations is to enable participants to
experience the accumulation of the different perspectives as part of one complex
conflict story. Fisher says,

That's what I meant by point counterpoint. It's a conversation qf, "This is
what it's like for me. " "Oh, this is what it's like for me. " And the nice thing
about this is it's not about, "Well, your story isn't valid because my story
proves it wrong." No story is wrong ... You just keep building layers, and
layers, and layers of context which help people hold all the different poles
qf the story, of the total conflict story. So people are telling the story and
you can see how destruction and violence has imposed something on their
lives.
Psychodrama helps transform the embedded conflict narrative that is
present in so many intractable conflict situations. It is a unique method for
personalizing and validating the complexity of existing personal stories.
Psychodrama is uniquely positioned to help those on all sides of a conflict to
experience and empathize with one another's personal narratives. In addition, while
psychodrama is ultimately employed at the interpersonal level, it can be used to
address situations that have taken place at varying levels and in diverse contextsfrom family conflicts at the interpersonal level to ethnic conflicts at the international
level.
Work With "Cold Cases". Intractable conflicts are often the result of
accumulated stereotyping, selective perception, and cognitive rigidity. These
processes can fuel dehumanization of the enemy, which can lead to moral
disengagement (Bandura, 1982), whereby people develop rigid moral boundaries
that justify a hostile cessation of contact and communication with out-group
members (Coleman 2003). In this context, it can seem impossible to bring
conflicting groups together to help the conflict become more tractable. Jamieson
describes a practice in which he and some colleagues were able to overcome this
problem. They engaged a joint working group comprised of business people and
environmentalists to dialogue about environmental/development cases that had
already been decided at some point in the past. The group referred to these cases as
"cold cases" since they had already been decided, and thus did not hold the same
potential for heated or "hot" problematic debate as some similar yet more current
cases did.
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Below, Jamieson notes some of the factors that contributed to the success of
the work between the business executives and the environmentalists. However, he
observes that the most difficult part of the process was getting the opposing parties
to sit down at the table together in the first place.

I'll tell you the hardest thing. Actually, it wasn't very hard to get this to
happen once you got people together. You did all the kind of usual things.
You gave them confidentiality, you gave them food, you.flattered them, you
created a kind of camaraderie within the group. I mean, I think we did do
some role playing and side switching. But mainly we kind of set this up as a
collaborative problem solving enterprise ... Also the people we were dealing
with were all really extraordinary people. I mean, they were people who
were leaders, and were aggressive in the sense of once they took something
on they wanted to make something happen. The hardest part was to get
people to agree to do this in the first place.
Jamieson describes the encounter that took place once he and his colleagues
had gathered the group:

We got these sort of intractable business types together with these
intractable environmentalists, who basically were the people who would be
wringing each other's necks and suing each other. And what we did is we
took some old conflicts, what we called cold cases, rather than hot cases,
and we essentially got them to work over cold cases together. And the thing
that was really kind of amazing is when it came to analyzing and
understanding the cold cases, they turned out to have a lot in common. I
mean, they would come to some-consensus might be too strong-but, you
know sometimes they would even switch sides on the cold cases ...
Jamieson continues to describe how working with the cold cases enabled
some members of both parties to not only begin to see the situation from the other
sides' perspective, but actually in some cases to become so persuaded by the
reasoning of the other side's perspective, that they publicly changed their point of
view on the subject at hand.

They would actually switch. I mean, looking back, analyzing, seeing what
happened, looking at the facts in a less charged way, and so on and so
forth, sometimes one side who you have thought of as being anti-Green
would end up saying that they thought a more green response was the right
one, and someone who was on the green side ...
Publicly switching one's point of view on a subject that holds deep
symbolic meaning and is linked with one's identity tends to be a very difficult and
rare activity for parties in intractable conflict. Jamieson suggests that working with
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cold cases may enable parties embroiled in ideological conflict to switch sides more
easily for a couple of reasons. First, working with cold cases helps them to see the
complexity of the situation more clearly. Because the discussions focus on
situations that have already been decided at some point in the past, there is less
tangibly at stake, and the issues become less emotionally charged. This provides an
environment in which the parties can feel safe viewing the situation from alternative
perspectives. Second, the ability to perceive the situation as more complex and
nuanced motivates them to demonstrate that they are rational, fair-minded human
beings who are open to being persuaded by compelling arguments that they may not
have previously considered. Jamieson says,
[Discussing cases that had already been decided] enabled [the
participants] to see that the cases tended to be very complicated and have
all sorts of unpredictable aspects. I think that most people, even people
who are really pretty ideologically driven are ... they don't see themselves as
these automatons who are just doing logical deductions from some grand
principle. I mean, they see themselves as being responsive to the way the
world is ... So when it's a cold case and things come out looking a way that
would look very surprising, in a way that just shows their fair-mindedness.
The parties' willingness to become persuaded by the other side's arguments
in the context of discussing cold cases was representative of one of the positive
outcomes of the experience, which was both parties' willingness to recognize the
humanity of the other side and to restore dignity to the other side.
... The biggest lesson substantively about these cases was that there was
really no single right answer, and how complex the cases were ... So in a
way, almost more than anything, I feel like what the cases showed-what
happened between people and process was enormously important, and the
other thing that was so important was the kind of humility that it
engendered And that was more important than sort of overt sideswitching, ifyou will ...By working through these cold cases with the enemy,
it also gave them some trust that the enemy wasn't just an ideological
monster, but was someone who was actually sensitive to a variety of values
and nuances.
If using cold cases encourages parties to publicly display more "fairminded" behavior and enables parties to recognize the dignity and humanity of the
other side, this bodes well for the potential this practice may have to help parties
build relationships that will make it possible to work together on current cases in the
future. If so, this model seems worth replicating on a broader scale. For example,
practitioners working with groups divided along the abortion rights issue, or in
religiously-based or other ideologically-based conflicts could bring leaders from all
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sides together to discuss cold cases as a way to build relationships between the
parties while engaging in a frank discussion of the issues.
Study Limitations and Methodological Recommendations
There is an inherent tension in conducting elicitive research. On the one
hand, we seek to be as elicitive as possible by asking participants to tell us what was
important to them. On the other hand, we direct participants to shed light on a
specific problem in which we are interested. Perhaps as a result of directing
participants' answers more than we should have, despite broad diversity in
disciplinary backgrounds and nationalities among the participants in this study,
many of their perspectives and approaches to intractable conflict were similar to
others interviewed, and to others currently working in the field. This data leads us
to the following methodological recommendations for future similar studies in this
area: 1) Refrain from using specific words or catch phrases that might bias
participants to think about the phenomenon in a specific or narrow way. We would
use a cover story in order to elicit ideas and insights on the general phenomenon of
"unsolvable problems" rather than specifically on intractable social conflict. 2)
Create and communicate a more specific profile of the ideal interviewee. We would
seek specifically to interview experts in the basic sciences, medicine, engineering,
architecture and the visual arts. 3) Do not send participants materials regarding our
understanding of intractable conflict. Instead, ask participants to send us references
and/or background information on their work prior to conducting the interviews.
Gaining some familiarity with the participants' professional backgrounds would
enable us to enter the interviews with a basic understanding of the participants'
fields, and thus to focus more directly on the "unsolvable problems" in each
interviewee's content area of expertise. While this method would invariably bring
up its own set of challenges, such as the researcher's need to integrate large
amounts of new and unfamiliar information, the benefits would likely outweigh the
costs in this case.
Conclusion
This project was developed as a study examining metaphors, approaches to,
and practices for engaging with intractable social conflict from a variety of
disciplinary perspectives. We hope the summary of ideas put forth in this paper
inspires readers to use the ideas highlighted in this paper and to continue to uncover
new information about understanding and dealing with "unsolvable problems" in a
variety of disciplines. While conducting such out-of-discipline research studies can
be methodologically challenging, it seems especially worthy for scholars to embark
on this type of research in the domain of intractable conflict. Given the persistent
and troubling events unfolding around the world today, there is great power in
generating ideas from across disciplines towards understanding, and dealing
effectively with, the highly complex phenomenon of intractable social conflict.
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COMMENTARY:
BASQUE A VENUES TOWARD PEACE:
BUILDING THE NEW ROAD TO A NEW DAWN, A NEW BEGINNING*
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J. P. Linstroth

With the declaration of a permanent ceasefire by "Basque Homeland and
Freedom" (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA) on the 22 nd of March to begin on the 24 th
of March of this year, a new dawn breaks in Basque history and Basque politics.
There may be those who doubt this peace but I remain hopeful that the Basques will
be able to reconcile their internal differences and begin this journey anew. The
Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero has agreed to begin talks on
the Basque ceasefire beginning this summer 2006 and many in the Basque region
are expectant of the promise of change after forty years of conflict. To date,
progress on the peace talks has been slow without any discemable results and with
many expressed frustrations of waiting Basques for the peace process to begin in
earnest.
From my knowledge of the Basque conflict and having spent years there for
the purposes of research, the Basque peace process is not so much significant in
terms of previous ETA ceasefires and the last one of 1998, but in what the future
holds for it and the Basque Country. To this end, it is less important to look back
than to look forward-what might be? After so much conflict, peace is uneasy,
uncanny, uncertain, but it is a new avenue nonetheless and one filled with fresh
hope and promise. To obtain lasting peace is the most difficult road of all but the
rewards are potentially boundless.
Indeed, we may wish to ponder the past happenings in Northern Ireland, or
the days, weeks, and months prior to the 'Good Friday Agreement' on the I 0th of
April of 1998 as a corollary within contemporary Europe and as superficial
benchmark for the future in the Basque Country. Not only because the Basques
themselves have done so, admiring Irish visitors such as Gerry Adams, Martin
McGuinness, and Father Alec Reid, as spokespersons for lessons learned from
Northern Ireland but as partners in a Basque peace process as well. By superficially
comparing the peace accords in Northern Ireland with the promise of resolution for
the Basque conflict, there are several considerations to contemplate. For example, it
would have been unimaginable to have outlawed Sinn Fein, or labeled them a
terrorist organization prior to Irish peace. It would have been unimaginable not to
have Sinn Fein involved in the Irish peace talks. Likewise if Madrid is to accept the
Basque peace with sincerity it must recognize that all political parties should be
invited to upcoming peace talks, including the "Unity" political party (Batasuna) .
This is the same Basque political party which supported ETA terrorist activities in
the past and was outlawed by the Spanish government in 2002 as well as declared a
terrorist organization (along with ETA) by the U.S. State Department. After
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September 11 th , 2001 declaring political parties as terrorist organizations has been
made easier by governments like those in Spain following the rhetoric of the socalled "war on terror" by the United States.
Regardless of the reasoning behind declaring political parties as terrorist
organizations, in the Basque peace talks all points of view and perspectives must be
heard, including marginalized ones. Equally as in Northern Ireland when the peace
process began to take hold as a forthcoming reality, there was the question of
political prisoners. So too for the Basques the question of the more than 600
political prisoners scattered throughout Spain has been contentious and remains on
the table for discussion. The topic must be discussed as openly as was the case in
Northern Ireland prior to the Good Friday Agreement. These are difficult roads
which lay ahead but the Spanish government, nor the Basques, should be fearful of
crossing these roads on this long journey.
If this peace is to be mired in labeling, and I hope it will not be, then the
Spanish state must accept and examine some of its own culpability in continuing the
Basque conflict. Indeed, if we truly wish to analyze terrorism, then we also need to
acknowledge "state terror" of the Spanish state as well. Every person in the Basque
Country and in Spain is familiar with the sad fate of Jose Lasa and Josu Zabala,
ETA activists killed and tortured by vigilante paramilitary organization, the "Antiterrorist Group of Liberation" (Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberaci6n, GAL). In 1995
their bodies were uncovered and their remains were identified by a forensic
pathologist in the Spanish-Basque city of San Sebastian. In effect, they "became the
first 'disappeared' of the Spanish democracy" (Aretxaga, 2000, pp. 54-55). Indeed
the implications of the atrocities committed by GAL brought many from the
socialist government of Felipe Gonzalez under public scrutiny and to trial for 67
extra-judicial killings. There are other fatalities, wounded, and sufferers to account
for as well.
Hence, along this road to peace we cannot forget the many victims of the
Basque conflict. After all, "violence targets social bonds and cultural practices as
much as it targets the body and psyche" (Suarez-Orozco and Robben, 2000, p. 10).
Only by listening to the victims of the conflict as well as the political actors can a
true healing process begin.
Researchers commenting on Basque victims of the conflict summarized
their findings of victimization in the Spanish-Basque province of Gipuzkoa in the
following manner:
Each victim implies the victimization of an entire family. Of
the victims interviewed for one study in the province of
Gipuzkoa, 23 percent of civilian casualties had been caused
'by error,' 65.4 percent of those interviewed still suffered
psychological trauma, and 73 percent of them cited negative
'social consequences'. In 65 .4 of the cases their economic
circumstances had worsened. Nothing better captures in cold
numbers the vastness of ET A's real violence than these
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hundreds of victimized families (Zulaika and Douglass, 1996,
p. 194).
Whether discussing the v1cttms of the Basque conflict in quantifiable
numbers such as the 812 victims of ETA or the less discussed aspects of the Basque
conflict in general, I am particularly mindful of Basque thinking and how Basques
might perceive peacebuilders, meddlers, and outsiders, who comment upon or
theorize about their struggle. I remember visiting one Basque restaurant along the
Gipuzkoan coast with a sign over the restaurant's bar which read, "we do not
discuss politics here".
This is why I find others who have commented on Basque peacebuilding
sometimes less than genuine. One among them has been John Paul Lederach, who
tells a story of a conversation he had with one Basque gentleman in regard to "a
proposal for a dialogue process": "They will. .. smell something wrong that has
nothing to do with the words but with who is proposing it, who is financing it, who
is included. It won't have much to do with the idea. It will have to do with what
sense their nose gives them" (Lederach, 2005, p. 109). For my part, I can only
formulate that Lederach misquoted this Basque man. As I have learned Basques are
generally distrustful of outsiders and it may be that this Basque in a wry way was
letting Lederach know that a Basque peace cannot be attained from outside forces,
foreign peacemakers and foreign peacebuilders, but from within and amongst
Basques. If Lederach knew Basques at all, he would know them to honor their
words, their friendships, and honor trust. As the Basque saying states, "my word is
my word" (hitza hitza).
As other conflict-resolution theorists have stated, "culture is not reducible
to behavior; to 'know' a culture is not to be able to predict each and every act of
each and every member of a group" (Avruch and Black, 2001, p. 7). We must,
therefore, not rely upon cultural reductionism and instead, above all, avoid
unnecessary quips in trying to encapsulate a people in one line.
As researchers and peace practitioners it is essential to understand cultures
we are describing first and actively find the voices within them, indeed all
expressions of cultural mentality. Only then can we hope to reach indigenous
concepts of reconciliation and resolution from the subjective point of view. This is
the imagining we need, not one based upon false and high moralizing of others, but
grounded in deep-human concerns within the cultural matrix of societies and from
their multiple points of view. If we are telling stories of other cultures, such views
must be based upon respect and true empathy and as much as possible to attempt
capturing an essence ofreality, and not one from passing snippets. Only then is this
road to peace a viable reality, and for Basques only then can it be called "peace"
(bakea) . For this reason when I think of the Basque peace process, I think how they
formulate ideas in their own words and the meanings they give to concepts within
the Basque language (euskera), one of the only non-Indo-European languages and
perhaps the most ancient in Western Europe.
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As Basques embark on this untested path, they will look toward mutual
support and fellowship in this process and reach some sort of "harmony"
(gogaidetasuna). Even more difficult for Basques in peace development is how to
incorporate the "other" (aurkakoa), Spain and France, as part of this process. So too
Spain and France have to decide how to allow Basques to achieve more autonomy,
perhaps even independence in the new Europe, the Europe without borders, this new
federation and union of European states.
To summarize, there is no blueprint to peace apart from communication and
dialogue. Therefore, if the Basque Country and Spain look to Ireland for this
avenue, they will be mindful of keeping an open-mind and allowing for dialogue
among all political parties as essential components toward amity, reconciliation, and
resolution. The lesson in Ireland, among many, is that a space of trust must be
created, even if seemingly, there is not one. Likewise a sense of "respect"
( begirunea) must be created, the openness to listen to all sides, openness to be
patient, and to allow dialogue to happen. This means putting aside past differences
and creating a space for peace, brick by brick, slowly, slowly, and "calmly, calmly"
(lasai-lasai) . In essence, the way to peace is long and arduous.
There is more than just a peace process at stake here, or a meeting at a table,
it is the creation of a "peaceful society" which is vital. Creating an actual,
practicable, and sustaining peace is more an art than a science, and it has to do with
changing fundamentals, transforming value systems, beliefs, and a willingness to
imagine living in a peaceful space. What are peaceful societies and how do we
conceptualize them, we might ask?
This of course means giving up the bellicose capacity toward war, and
toward conflict-to be "peacemakers" (bakegileak). Aside from ETA giving up its
"actions" (egintzak)-as well as its arms, kidnapping, and revolutionary taxationit too means Spain must lessen its police presence in the Basque region. Equally it
means that Spain must repeal anti-terrorist legislation, and abolish unconstitutional
laws, especially those which suspend habeas corpus and facilitate states-ofexception. Furthermore, it means legitimizing political parties, which the Spanish
government deems to be terrorist-oriented, importantly the "Unity" political party,
which in the past supported ETA terrorism (Batasuna). It also means calling for an
amnesty of all political exiles, those activists living in other countries.
Such are the apparitions of the state to Basques as these repressive leftovers
are haunting reminders of the Franco dictatorship, the presence of that totalitarian
state in the present. In short, all such new beginnings are about concessions, mutual
concessions, even if such measures are exceptionally uncomfortable.
Recognizing the other is difficult. As an American and anthropology
scholar, I have had the good fortune and privilege to speak to many Basques on
many subjects. Some of the more interesting discussions I have had were with
fishermen. On one occasion, I remember discussing history of the United States
with one Basque mariner, and I explained to him that on one of the early flags of the
American Revolution was a banner depicting a coiled snake which read, "Don't
Tread On Me", similar to the banner of ETA "Always Continue the Struggle"
(Bietan Jarrai), a double-edged axe coiled with a hissing serpent. He was dismayed
Ptace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2
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at this and literally speechless that the United States at one time had its own
revolutionary struggle in the colonies, let alone the similar snake metaphor. His
view of America of course was guided by the popular stereotype as an unwieldy
hegemonic and imperialistic power. Such a view I must grant is not without some
justification for the United States has been in much international disfavor recently,
whether as a result of the War in Iraq, inclusive of abuses in the Abu Ghraib prison
and the Guantanamo naval base, and other atrocities elsewhere since World War II.
As I mentioned to this Basque fisherman, there were lessons too to be
gleaned from reading American history. By many accounts what happened in 1776
with the Declaration of Independence by 13 British colonies was the first modemnationalist movement and modem-political-revolution of its kind. Even so, it was
not until the Treaty of Paris of 1783 which ratified American colonial rights and
finalized Britain's recognition of colonial independence. The promise of the newly
formed and united colonies were exceptional, based upon dreams of equality,
freedom, human rights, and justice, founding principles which allowed the colonial
founders and forefathers of the United States to form their own government, rule of
law, and vision for the future. So distant are we from this American Revolution,
even as Americans, that in everyday language, especially the popular usage and
abuse of the term "terrorist" by governmental officials that George Washington
himself, the first President of the United States, would be considered a terrorist by
the British in keeping with today's standards (Zulaika and Douglass, 1996, pp. 1213).
Thinking about this past and this present, the American Revolution, Basque
independence, Basque peace-very few Americans know about the Basque conflict,
save for American-Basques living in California, Idaho, Nevada, Wyoming, and
those sparsely scattered in other states. Americans as a whole know much more
about the past civil unrest in Northern Ireland and the present struggle in Palestinelsrael, than what is happening or has happened in the Basque Country. This is due
to demographic factors and to the American media. Irish-Americans and JewishAmericans, for example, far outnumber Basque-Americans and undeniably this has
had a significant influence on American foreign policy as a result. It largely means
that the Basque conflict and the Basque peace are being ignored by the movers and
shakers of this country, instead of addressed and given significance. While the
United States cannot solve the Basque conflict, it is right to try to have more
Americans understand it and the ensuing Basque peace initiatives which wil1
advance as the permanent ceasefire takes hold.
We as peace practitioners should be especially mindful of happenings in the
Basque Country as a way of understanding intractable conflicts and as a new model
for understanding how to make peace in marginalized conflict zones around the
world. The Basque Country is small, roughly the size of Connecticut. Even so, the
implications of resolving this conflict are enormous for Europe and Spain. It means
the end of an era, the end of European domestic terrorism, and the end of Westem
European separatist movements (save, perhaps, Corsica). It means that peoples like
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Basques become recognized in the European Union, not as Spanish or French, but
having their own rights as well. This is the hope of the Basques.
The Basques of old were seafarers and whalers, New World explorers, and
never seemed to fear the unknown. I suspect the brave and dynamic Basques of
today have the same spirit as their ancestors, knowing them and how they embrace
challenges. So too, this is a dawning of a new Basque era. These are the same clever
people who remember their ancient foral-laws (medieval agreements with the
Spanish crown) and the swearing of oaths under the sacred Tree of Gemika, and
before this the annual meetings of chieftains in the Basque lands. As the Basques
travel on the road toward peace, we should be watching what happens. For amidst
this world in conflict, there is one more place seeking peace, one more region where
peace may come soon, one more people where hope is still possible. As the
renowned poet and sage from New England, Robert Frost so eloquently penned:
" ... Somewhere ages and ages hence: Two roads diverged in a wood, and I-I took
the one less traveled by, And that has made all the difference". I hope for the
Basques this new road to peace is the one that makes all the difference for them and
. for their future.

References
Aretxaga, B. 2000. "A Fictional Reality: paramilitary death squads and the
construction of state terror in Spain." In J. A. Sluka (ed.), Death Squad: the
anthropology of state terror. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Avruch, K. and P. W. Black. 2001. "Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings:
problems and prospects." In P. Chew (ed.), The Conflict and Culture
Reader. New York: New York University Press.
Frost, R. 1993. Selected Poems o.fRobert Frost. New York: Barnes & Noble Books.
Kemp, G. 2004. "The Concept of Peaceful Societies." In G. Kemp and D. P. Fry
(eds.), Keeping the Peace: conflict resolution and peaceful societies around
the world. London: Routledge.
Lederach, J. P. 2005. The Moral Imagination: the art and soul o.f building peace.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sluka, J. A. 2000. "Introduction: state terror and anthropology". In J. A. Sluka (ed.),
Death Squad: the anthropology of state terror. Philadelphia, PA: University
of Pennsylvania Press.
Suarez-Orozco, M.M. and A.C.G.M. Robben. 2000. "Interdisciplinary perspectives
on violence and trauma." In M. M. Suarez-Orozco and A. C. G. M. Robben
(eds.), Cultures Under Siege: collective violence and trauma. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Zulaika, J. and W.A. Douglass. 1996. Terror and Taboo: the follies, fables, and
faces of terrorism. London: Routledge.

Peace and Conflic::_t Studies• Volume 13, Number 2

- 78 -

·!

Commentary: Basque Avenues Toward Peace

*ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am most grateful to Gorka Espiau Idoiaga, Senior Jennings Randolph
Fellow of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and Foreign Representative of
the Basque Peace Group, "Togetherness" (Elkarri) for his helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this essay. A different version of this article appeared in this peace
organization's magazine, Revista Elkarri (Togetherness Magazine) as "The
Ceasefire from the U.S.A." ("La Tregua desde las E.E. U U"'), pp. 42-46, May
2006. I am also indebted to the editors of Elkarri in allowing me to produce a
different version of this commentary piece in English here

Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2
- 79 -

Peace and Conflict Studies Editors:
1ngs Randolph
resentative of
omments on
d in this peace
in e) as "The
t. 42-46, May
to produce a

Dr. Howon Jeong,
Dr. Sean Byrne,
Dr. Honggang Yang,

1994-2002
2002-May 2003
June 2003-Present

PCS gratefully acknowledges the warm encouragement and support from
NSU President Ray Ferrero, Jr.

Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 2

....

- 80 {......_-

